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ABSTRACT
This study begins with a reading of Franz Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption and
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra in a manner that offers evidence for what I
call a feminine divine. In reading the Star against Zarathustra I explore how even as
Rosenzweig appears to praise Nietzsche as being emblematic of Rosenzweig’s “new
thinking,” Rosenzweig eventually finds Nietzsche falls short, (or, in other words,
Rosenzweig critiques Nietzsche in suggesting his pagan roots prevent him from ever
reaching Revelation). I suggest Nietzsche’s texts do indicate a type of divine inspiration,
but it is one coming not from the Father God of male monotheism, but of a Mother God
held latent in history and western philosophy. It is through this very defense of Nietzsche
against Rosenzweig that I begin to articulate a hidden feminine divine.
Through close readings of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra along with passages from
Ecce Homo and Will to Power I defend Nietzsche against Rosenzweig’s critique. I also
refer to a text held latent in both the Star and Zarathustra, Goethe’s Faust. It is through a
reading of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as it embodies notions of a feminine divine in
Goethe’s Faust that I offer a more complex approach to a feminine divinity.
Just as I suggest the key to my defense of Nietzsche consists in my recovering in
his writings of a “divine feminine,” I also assert the significance in another major writer
who was a contemporary of Nietzsche and Rosenzweig: Lou Andreas-Salomé. Known
by some as the “mother of psychoanalysis,” Andreas-Salomé offers much in a
ii

development of a feminine divine originating in Rosenzweig's and Nietzsche’s texts and
continuing on to writings of French psychoanalytic philosophers Julia Kristeva, Luce
Irigaray, and Hélène Cixous. In short, I lay the groundwork for developing a feminist
philosophy of religion from Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s texts following through
Andreas-Salomè’s writing, using theorists in the French psychoanalytic tradition to move
forward toward a contemporary feminist philosophy of religion that includes a feminine
divine. I conclude by suggesting some practical applications of this feminist philosophy
of religion that may be useful within the realm of inter-religious dialog as well as in
feminist philosophy in general.
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Chapter One:
Seeking the Face Behind the Face
I cannot think of any need in childhood as strong as the need for a father’s protection.
Thus the part played by the oceanic feeling, which might seek something like the
restoration of limitless narcissism, is ousted from a place in the foreground . . . . There
may be something further behind that, but for the present it is wrapped in obscurity.
Sigmund Freud1
There is no other way to express the Truth. Only when we see the Star as countenance,
do we transcend every possibility and simply see.
Franz Rosenzweig2
Night has come: now my craving breaks out of me like a
well; to speak I crave.
Night has come; now all fountains speak more loudly.
And my soul, too, is a fountain.
Night has come; now all the songs of lovers awaken. And
my soul, too, is the song of a lover.
Thus sang Zarathustra
Friedrich Nietzsche3
The good Lord is such a good Lord with such a good Mother too . . . .
Ben Harper4
1

Sigmund Freud. Civilization and Its Discontents. In The Standard Edition of the
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. trans. James Strachey. Vol XXI.
(London: The Hogarth Press, 1973), 172. In reference to this passage in her essay
“Freud’s Prehistoric Matrix—Owing ‘Nature’ a Death,’ Joan Raphael-Leff notes that
Freud wrote it three months before his mother’s death. See Joan Raphael-Leff, “Freud’s
Prehistoric Matrix—Owing ‘Nature’ a Death.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis
88, no. 6 (2007).
2
Franz Rosenzweig, The Star of Redemption, trans. William W. Hallo (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1985).
3
Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, tans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Viking Press, 1966), 107.
4
Ben Harper. “When She Believes,” Diamonds on the Inside, Virgin Records, 2003, CD.
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Poetry is just the evidence of life. If your life is burning well, poetry is just the ash.
Leonard Cohen5
The history of philosophy of religion in the west does not include a feminine
divine. There is no fully fleshed out depiction of a feminine divine as an integral aspect
of western conceptions of divinity, even within the context of feminist philosophy. In
this dissertation I look back to philosophical texts from the late eighteenth and earlier
twentieth century in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Franz
Rosenzweig’s Star of Redemption respectively in order to explore what I call a veiled
feminine divine. In my initial reading of these two texts I begin to unveil the “face
behind the face” as an approach to a feminine divine that I suggest can only most fully
come to the fore through additional insights and writings by Freud, Lou Andreas-Salomé
and contemporary French feminist psychoanalytical theorists.
What makes my return to the thinking of Nietzsche and Rosenzweig unique is that
I do not trace the philosophical lineage of either thinker, which has certainly already been
done before. Instead, I attempt to make two moves that have not been made before, at
least not in the sustained, conjoint, and focused way that I want to make them. Those two
moves are: 1) to read their two greatest texts together; 2) to bring in the contemporary
and alternative philosophical perspectives and voices of certain French feminist
philosophers. Concerning the second of these two moves, I provide interpretations of an
aspect of Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s philosophical discourses that has not received

5

Leonard Cohen. Great-Quotes.com, Gledhill Enterprises, 2011.
http://www.great-quotes.com/quote/230341, accessed Wed May 18 17:55:12 2011.
2

due attention previously. What I thereby attempt is a recovery, in and through the
conjunction of their two great works, of an otherwise lost feminine divine. I will
demonstrate that using certain tools of contemporary French feminist theory in the
psychoanalytic tradition to read Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra with and
against one another opens an unexpected way to develop out of the interplay of those two
texts a concept of divinity that makes proper room for a feminine divine. I explore this
feminine divine as not just an antithesis of a male God. Rather, I work through the above
mentioned sources in order to explore a feminine aspect of divinity that presents itself in
a potent and powerful reappearance of the feminine that has been lost and forgotten in
western philosophy of religion as well as in the western psyche.
I defend the particular set of writers I use to support my thesis by relying upon an
approach to academic scholarship that Buddhist scholar Jose Cabézón developed called
“anarchic consequentialism.” This is a methodological approach that begins with nothing
more than a hunch, a feeling that the exploration of a particular set of texts will bring
about a fruitful outcome. Of course, if, after following through in exploring the hunch,
one does not find the hoped for “return,” then the writer must be satisfied and take
responsibility for the consequences of that negative outcome. However, the wager being
made is that the consequences will be positive, and it is the potential for that positive
outcome that justifies the risk.
I emphasize that my particular methodology is a feminist approach in that it seeks
to recover what has been repressed, the feminine divine itself, by creating a space for its
presence that has not been fully opened within the context of traditional philosophy of
religion and theology in the West, even in its most recent forms. I aim to provide an
3

opening to face the feminine divine, in other words, that has not already been explored,
depicted, and reified in Goddess imagery, or in any other form, in the West. It is, to the
contrary and as I will demonstrate, one that has been forgotten and rejected.
This work functions in the spirit of Michel Foucault’s commentary on Nietzsche’s
approach to history, that is of a genealogical approach to “truth,” as Foucault describes in
his essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” I call it a feminist historical “methodology,”
in that it, like genealogy itself, “operates on a field of entangled and confused
parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.” Like
a palimpsest, in other words, as in Freud’s reference to and use of the “mystic writing
pad,” there is an evocation, when facing a text, to not stop at the surface level of what
appears on a tablet of history, but instead to seek for the traces underneath that have been
covered over, hidden, repressed.
The model of a palimpsest evokes the very title of my dissertation, as well as the
title of Rosenzweig’s Star, the significance of which I find in Rosenzweig’s description
of the Star of David as the face in which God incarnates Godself. Within the Western
tradition of philosophy of religion and theology, I note the assumption that one may not
look directly at God and live; God is too awesome to “face.” Looking directly at this
divine is unbearable. It can only be approached indirectly, through a speculum of sorts.
In his Star of Redemption, Rosenzweig presents such a speculum in which to view the
Divine. But I suggest that behind this face/façade is another face. It is this other face that
holds the power, like the image of Medusa, that is even more difficult to face. This other
face, I suggest, exists behind the surface level of Rosenzweig’s Star and is the face of the
feminine divine.
4

My argument is that this “face behind the face” is the truth that may appear to be
too unbearable to bear/see directly, or “face to face,” at least within the realm of western
philosophy of religion/theology. I make an attempt to seek this face, expose it, and find
ways to create another speculum to face the traditionally un-faceable as feminine divine.
I do that, however, not in the manner that a number of other feminist theologians,
those who argue for the acknowledgement of a distinctly feminine deity, have attempted.
Instead I go beyond former attempts to recreate or recapture a divine mother or goddess
that is merely the antithesis of a male god.
Even as I mainly use the above-mentioned writers in my analysis, I also suggest
that after scratching the surface of their texts, I find it useful to note residues from
another writer/text, namely, Goethe’s Faust. I find in Goethe’s Faust insights that are
related to a Nietzschean, and as such, transvaluated, feminine divine.
In terms of my methodological approach, I assert that it is uniquely feminist. I
label it feminist because of my emphasis on the process of finding what has been
repressed, hidden, and denigrated, like the feminine in western thought and life in
general. I seek less a new mother substitute, however, and more a seemingly “empty”
opening to something that has yet to be uncovered or revealed. This aspect of my method
is integral to a feminist philosophy and theology, even a feminist approach to history.
Additionally, such an approach resonates with Cabézón’s “anarchic
consequentialism,” in that I cannot give you the fruits of the project at the beginning,
before I have made my journey; I can only hint toward potential consequences. My
reader must trust that the direction I point may indeed offer certain rewards. It will be up
to my reader to find out if this is true on his or her own.
5

Yet even if I fail and lose my wager, the risk would still have been worth taking.
Jewish song-writer and poet Leonard Cohen’s commentary on the lyrics to his song, “The
Traitor,” says that the song expresses just such a point about an aborted but still
worthwhile journey: “It was about the feeling that we have of betraying some mission
that we were mandated to fulfill and being unable to fulfill it, coming to understand that
the real mandate was not to fulfill it and [that] the deeper courage was to stand guiltless
in the predicament in which [one finds] [one]self.”6
Following Cabézón’s methodology of “anarchic consequentialism,” even as I take
responsibility of the outcome of the trajectory of my dissertation, I also hope to guide my
reader to what will perhaps be some unexpected outcomes that he or she could not have
formally anticipated.
It is in accordance with this same sort of methodological approach, in fact, that I
first became interested in reading Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. I
found in these texts that there was something that seemed to connect them. What I claim
is the connection at issue, when made explicit, is the face behind the face of
Rosenzweig’s Star—the face of the feminine divine.
Furthermore, just as Rosenzweig and Nietzsche both emphasize a philosophy that
serves life and thinks in the fullest sense “concretely,” my approach to the feminine
divine involves more than mere abstractions. Rather, it must necessarily involve
embodiment, especially in and as actual women.

6

Leonard Cohen I’m Your Man. DVD. Directed by Lian Lunson. Santa Monica, CA:
Lionsgate, 2005.
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It is appropriate, then, that as soon as I read in any detail things by and about a
certain female writer and vibrant personality, namely, Lou Andreas-Salomé, I realized
that I could not leave her writings out of my project. It turns out that she in fact is the
very embodiment—or so, at least, will I argue—of the “face behind the face” with regard
to Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, most especially when those two
works are brought, in our reading, face to face with one another. It is she, I will argue,
who embodies the very feminine divine whose face appears beneath and through the face
of those two texts—who is that very face itself, in its concrete embodiment, perhaps in
her very being, but most certainly in her writing. If that is so, however, as I will try show
it is, then adequately and accurately to read and interpret Nietzsche’s text and life, and
then to go on to do the same with Rosenzweig’s text (and perhaps even his life, as well),
may be greatly facilitated, at the least, by carefully reading her writings and considering
her life.
In this connection, it will be useful carefully to draw a distinction between two
very different sorts of questions that can fruitfully be raised about a philosophical text in
relation to the life of that text’s author. On the one hand, there are such historical
questions as how closely a philosopher’s or other author’s text can be correlated with
events in her or his biography, or just what direct influences the works of earlier authors
may have had upon the given author’s own thought and writing. On the other hand, there
are what might well be called hermeneutical questions that can also be raised about the
same authors and texts as those of concern in the just-mentioned “historical” questions.
By “hermeneutical” questions I mean such questions, to cite the hermeneutical question
that is most important for my own project in this dissertation, as that of whether
7

knowledge of a given fact or episode from the author’s biography, as revealed by
historical, biographical studies by qualified historians and biographers, casts new light on
a given text—such light, perhaps, that it even requires developing an entirely new
interpretation and understanding of the very meaning of the text itself, as such.
My dissertation is not historical, but philosophical. Accordingly, it is not
concerned with the sorts of historical questions just mentioned, but it is very definitely
concerned with the hermeneutical questions also just mentioned. In reading Rosenzweig
and Nietzsche the way I do, I am not attempting to write anything like a
psychobiography, seeking/speculating upon specific influences and all too often, in the
process, creating an easy target for any responsible scholar to hit with volleys of critical
arrows. Instead, I am conducting a hermeneutic exploration, one mindful of feminist
readings focusing on embodiment, where real life and its issues are concretely raised and
reflected upon in the text, and the text itself also comes out of real life.
In addition, it is worth observing at this point that I will be practicing reading
texts not only in terms of the concrete life and life-issues that provide the context
necessary for clear understanding of the text itself, but also as operating against life.
Such a complex reading practice enters into the realm of what is ‘hidden,’ often precisely
from the author no less than from others from the text. In contemporary western thought,
I suggest, a philosopher’s personal biography becomes most times, using Kristeva’s term,
abject. Here the notion of a feminist approach to interpretation is more like a revelation;
it includes that which was hidden/invisible, what has been “cast off,” includes it as
perhaps very significant, indeed, as the possible “origin” of thought and being, and
therefore necessary and important to bring into view.
8

Additionally, I stress how Nietzsche provides readers with a clear incentive to
consider his life experience in coming to read Zarathustra, due solely to the fact that he
writes, in Ecce Homo in particular, of the exact nature of his life experience when writing
Zarathustra. A thorough reading of Zarathustra, I assert, cannot exist, therefore, without
taking into account Nietzsche’s own summary of his experience writing the text.7
Again, not only may it be appropriate to consider some aspects of a philosopher’s
biography in reading her or his text, but I propose a certain hermeneutic that allows for
significant events and personal experiences to aid richly in interpreting a text. Certainly
Rosenzweig and Nietzsche’s writing style both evoke such a hermeneutic; their thoughts
spur their readers to discovery, even self-transformation, through the reading of their
texts. It is certainly the case that they express their thoughts using a truly literary style.
Appreciating the significance of their style helps support my particular approach to their
texts.
Both Franz Rosenzweig and Friedrich Nietzsche offer texts providing innovative
and penetrating directions in the history of western philosophy in general, the former
within the context of Jewish philosophy the latter as the forerunner for postmodern
continental philosophy. Rosenzweig and Nietzsche demonstrated innovation in their
ability to break with tradition. They were also able to bridge philosophical traditions of
the past with a new type of philosophical thinking and writing. One attribute among
others that makes their works so innovative is the evocative style of their writing; they

7

Paul Mendes-Flohr in fact suggests that one must take into account Rosenzweig's
encounter with Margrit (Gritli) Rosenstock-Huessy during the time he was writing the
second part of the Star. Paul Mendes-Flohr, private conversation, July 29, 2010.
9

both wrote in a prose that is more poetic than didactic. The most well read and widely
accepted translators of Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, William Gallo
and Walter Kaufman respectively, each note the unique writing style of both
philosophers.
Gallo writes in his translator’s preface to the Star: “The Star of Redemption is no
ordinary book, and its translation is no ordinary task. To do it justice, the translator must
approach it more like poetry than like a work of prose.” Not only does Rosenzweig’s
style of writing resemble more “poetry than . . . prose,” it is also filled with references to
works considered more literary than philosophical. Gallo continues: “Rosenzweig’s
magnum opus is, furthermore, a veritable mosaic of citations and allusions. [. . .] In
particular Rosenzweig spoke the language of Goethe’s Faust and other German
classics.”8
Walter Kaufman writes similarly of Nietzsche’s prose, even if in a critical and
derisive manner: “Zarathustra . . . cries out to be blue-penciled; and if it were more
compact, it would be more lucid too.” Despite such reservations, however, Kaufman
acknowledges a certain strength in Nietzsche’s style: “Even so, there are few works to
match its wealth of ideas, the abundance of profound suggestions, the epigrams, the wit.
What distinguishes Zarathustra is the profusion of ‘sapphires in the mud.’” Kaufman
concludes: “But what the book loses artistically and philosophically by never having been
critically edited by its author, it gains as a uniquely personal record.”9

8

William W. Hallo, preface to The Star of Redemption, by Franz Rosenzweig (Notre
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), vii.
9
Walter Kaufmann, preface to Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, by
Friedrich Nietzsche (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 106-7. For an analysis on
10

Even as Kaufman may attempt to find redeeming value in Nietzsche’s text as a
“personal record,” many philosophers from Nietzsche’s day to the present find the
personal nature of his writing less of a strength, philosophically, and more of a weakness.
Yet this personal style is on a par with the type of feminist philosophy able to break from
tradition and offer a new method of philosophical writing. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, as
well as Rosenzweig's Star, is filled with allusions to “Faust and other German classics”;
both also have direct and indirect references to the Bible. Through such literary
allusions, both writers call for their readers to uncover meaning in their work.
In this dissertation I have no concern with speculating on the possible “influence”
of the Bible, or Goethe, on Nietzsche or Rosenzweig, because knowledge of such a text
as the Bible, and the works of a writer of the stature of a Goethe, is simply a culturally
pervasive given in any culture where such texts and works are themselves pervasive, as
both the Bible and the works of Goethe were during the nineteenth century—and
certainly well into the twentieth--in Germany. I suggest viewing resonances between the
Bible and Goethe’s Faust in terms of the model of a palimpsest. My goal is not so much
to seek what may be the specific, direct influences or historical-biographical occurrences
that may underlie given passages in the texts at issue. Rather, I will be exploring
Nietzsche’s and Rosenzweig’s writings for residues of what may “belie” the text from a
hermeneutical perspective, in the sense the verb belie that indicates cases in which the
“surface” of the text—as a literary document, not as an historical-biographical archive—

Nietzsche’s poetic style as fundamental to his philosophy see Eric Blondel, “Nietzsche:
Life as Metaphor” in The New Nietzsche, ed. David Allison (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1985) pp. 150-175).
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may disguise the true nature of its content. My task, I reiterate, is not an historicalbiographical one, but a hermeneutical-philosophical one.
Concerning the hermeneutical approach I am adopting, to take into consideration
the personal nature of Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s writing, as well as the literary
references and allusions, even and indeed often the ones that operate below the level of
even the author’s explicit awareness, is simply indispensable for developing an adequate
understanding of both their main texts. Both characteristics of their writing encourages
their readers to stop, and think, to contemplate, sitting with the experience of not
knowing for a moment, as the Greeks referred to with the word aporia. To doubt, in
response to a text--to not be quite sure just what to say or to do, concerning what one is
reading--is often, if not always, closer to truth, than the type of approach that would
instead strive everywhere doubt arises to reduce as quickly the possibilities that arise in
“not knowing,” by resecuring the sense of safety that comes with the assurance (well
founded or not) that one in fact does now know. Not only is one then certain that one
does in fact know, rather, one also uses all one’s logic to defend one’s claim to certainty
against any possible attack, often even going so far as to argue that only a text which
permits such certainty deserves to be called “philosophy” in the first place.
Whereas analytical thinking is invaluable in many pursuits of knowledge, the
philosophical truth in Nietzsche and Rosenzweig’s writings, I assert, calls for their
readers to allow for the space that often exists precisely in contradiction, paradox, and
doubt. In approaching the particular texts I do, I wonder if readers are not closer to truth
in a stalled moment, a pause, a loss, than in any moment of joy in the supposedly final
acquisition of “mastery” of a philosophical text—or of life through “philosophy.”
12

Any serious reader/student of Rosenzweig and Nietzsche must acknowledge in
their works an explicit resistance to philosophical mastery. Nietzsche wrote about
philosophizing with a hammer, and Rosenzweig's philosophical aim was to leave behind
traditional approaches to philosophy as he viewed them, and as he saw them culminating
in German Idealism, and instead to make education/philosophy serve life.
Indeed, the nature of both Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche's styles encouraged their
readers to use a more integral approach in their study of philosophy. Furthermore, if
there is one thing the two philosophers share, it is their insistence that philosophy should
enhance living. This is a style, I will argue, that not only is similar to, but in fact helps
delineate what I will explore as a feminist approach to a philosophy of religion. This
stance stands in contrast to the philosophers associated with German Idealism, perhaps
most notably Hegel in relation to Rosenzweig's writing, and Kant in relation to
Nietzsche’s life and writing.
Furthermore, these two philosophers include both a notion of progression as well
as one of agon, or struggle, in both their writing and their lives. Indicative of an integral
approach to philosophy as life, this struggle is not primarily intellectual for these men. It
is not insignificant to note, as well, that they both suffered physically as well as mentally
in their all too brief creative lives.
I suggest that it is through three common attributes—that of working against or in
opposition to the past, having an ability to access philosophical meditations on truth in a
manner that calls their audience to recall literary and artistic references to unveil a
philosophical import of their writing, and lastly to do this in such a manner as to
incorporate bodily understanding, through a type of experiential knowledge—that both
13

Nietzsche and Rosenzweig philosophize in a manner that, following the formulation of
contemporary French philosopher and historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot,10 reflects not
so much a life devoted to philosophy, as a philosophy able to enhance life.
Not only does philosophy for these men articulate human explorations of many
aspects of human life, some directly or indirectly related to ethical and moral concerns,
but they also provide texts that in some cases explicitly and in some cases implicitly lead
toward altering not only some of one’s thinking but also, in a more comprehensive
fashion, one’s entire world-view. In this way I will emphasize aspects of Rosenzweig’s
and Nietzsche’s philosophy of life in terms that function as a predecessor to feminist
approaches to the philosophy of religion in this respect.
I reiterate that the feminist aspect of their philosophy lies in large part in their
insistence that philosophy itself must always arise in, remain in, and return to, historically
concrete, embodied experience. In attempting to articulate the features of the “face
behind the face” of Rosenzweig’s main work, that is, the hidden divine feminine as it
shines behind the both the Star and the Star (namely, of David), I note that, beginning
with Plato, Rosenzweig viewed the trajectory of western philosophical thought as
originating in the avoidance that which is the only inevitable: death. Moving from this
realization I find Rosenzweig’s Star, for all its seeming philosophical mastery, saves its
readers from a form of philosophical suicide through a very long, and at times difficult
journey to reach at last the view of the face of the divine at the end of the Star. As
already indicated, I will be exploring how this divine is not the masculine monotheistic

10

See Pierre Hadot, Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to
Foucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1995).
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male god, but the divinity one can only meet, as I will attempt to demonstrate, by
entering through the gate of love into life--the feminine divine.
Just as I first experienced on my own journey of reading the Star, I am convinced
that I could not be the only reader of his text that felt transformed somehow, felt they had
experienced an opening. It is this opening that I utilize as the only way to begin to
approach the feminine divine, the gateway of love to open to life. I acknowledge my
experience, but I do so because this is indeed why I begin my approach to the crux of my
movement from death into life through a close reading of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. I
chose to view Nietzsche through the lens of Rosenzweig's Star initially because of the
very plea they both initiate, a plea to pause and listen.
To speak in the manner of the New Testament, “for those who have ears to hear”:
I felt a call in Rosenzweig's text, to revisit Nietzsche, to praise him and critique him in
seeking hidden truths. I utilize historical inquiry according to the paradigm of
“genealogy,” using the imagery of the palimpsest, or “mystic writing pad,” to develop-to use Heidegger’s way of putting it in his interpretation of Nietzsche’s “Use and Abuse
of History for Life”--a truly “critical” interpretation of our contemporary, “current” lifesituation. Such genuinely “critical” history, or usage thereof, itself can only come forth,
as Heidegger indicates, through turning to the past, as it is carefully preserved by what
Nietzsche calls the “antiquarian” approach to history. At the same time, in order fully
and truly to serve life, all genuine “usage” of history for life, as we might say (as opposed
to its abusive usage “against” life), must also retrieve from the past that which can guide
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and direct the living, as “models” or “monuments” to emulate (hence, the need for what
Nietzsche calls “monumental” history), into the future.11
Furthermore, it is only in keeping in mind together these three approaches to
historical understanding (which the work of historians themselves can serve, but never
replace), that one can redeem the past, in the way that Walter Benjamin, for one, implores
his readers to anticipate, in his own writings. Benjamin’s approach to history is a
“critical” one, in Nietzsche’s sense; and for Benjamin it functions to “redeem” the past
itself--as, in her own fashion, Hannah Arendt emphasizes in her introduction to
Benjamin’s Illuminations. I propose that it is only after Nietzsche, that Arendt may
elucidate the notion of a critical history and/as philosophy by using Walter Benjamin’s
distinction between a commentary and a critique. Arendt quotes Benjamin: “If . . . one
views the growing work as a funeral pyre, its commentator can be likened to the chemist,
its critic to an alchemist. While the former is left with wood and ashes as the sole objects
of his analysis, the latter is concerned only with the enigma of the flame itself: the
enigma of being alive.” In further delineating a critically historical philosophy for life,
Arendt concludes: “The critic is an alchemist practicing the obscure art of transmuting
the futile elements of the real into the shining, enduring gold of truth, or rather watching
and interpreting the historical process that brings about such magical transfiguration . . .
.”12
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In expanding the role of an historical critic, I will use the image of Benjamin’s
“Angel of History,” as many others have before me, in order to present an accurate model
of history for the time—though I suggest it is currently outdated in terms that apply to the
present and will juxtapose it to another model of history, one that follows a feminist
approach I see as more applicable to contemporary life.
In Benjamin’s “Thesis on the Philosophy of History” he critiques both Paul Klee’s
painting “Angelus Novus” as well as Gerhard Scholem’s poem “Gruss vom Angelus” in
the following manner:
A Klee Painting named “Angelus Novus” shows an angel looking as though he is
about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are
staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel
of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage
and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and
make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has
got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them.
This storm irresistibly propels him in to the future to which his back is turned,
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward.
The angel of history is not looking forward to the future, but it is facing backward. The
backward glance is not identical to any one, or any conjunction, of Nietzsche’s
antiquarian, monumental or critical historical approaches. Instead, Benjamin’s angel’s
face appears frozen, paralyzed, unable to guide and direct, unable to do anything, it
appears, as its gaze is fixed permanently on the past. In contrast to the applicability
Benjamin’s image may have to “modernity,” perceived through that image to be an
arrested development, that image is not, I suggest, an adequate one to apply to what may
be called, following current fashion, “post-modernity”--and beyond—at least if it is to
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function, as Benjamin wanted his image to function, to “make whole what has been
smashed.”
Instead of using Benjamin’s “Angel of History,” I suggest we could fruitfully use
an image from an altogether different culture than Benjamin’s (or my) own: the image of
what is called Sankofa in the West African tradition:
Sankofa is expressed in the Akan language as ‘se wo were fi na wosan kofa a
yenki.’ Literally translated it means ‘it is not taboo to go back and fetch what you
forgot.’ ‘Sankofa’ teaches us that we must go back to our roots in order to move
forward. That is, we should reach back and gather the best of what our past has to
teach us, so that we can achieve our full potential as we move forward. Whatever
we have lost, forgotten, forgone or been stripped of, can be reclaimed, revived,
preserved and perpetuated.13
Sankofa represents a philosophical approach to history I support in terms of a feminist
methodology for a philosophy of religion or theology. It is significant to note,
additionally, that the historical model of Sankofa offers imagery of a winged creature,
like Klee’s and Scholem’s angel:
Visually and symbolically ‘Sankofa’ is expressed as a mythic bird that flies forward
while looking backward with an egg (symbolizing the future) in its mouth . . . . The
egg in its mouth represents the "gems" or knowledge of the past upon which
wisdom is based; it also signifies the generation to come that would benefit from
that wisdom . . . . The Akan believe that the past illuminates the present and that
the search for knowledge is a life-long process. The pictograph illustrates the quest
for knowledge, while the proverb suggests the rightness of such a quest as long as it
is based on knowledge of the past.14
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The imagery of Sankofa elicits a certain Faustian “quest for knowledge,” yet it is a quest
that does not serve individual tyranny, but instead creates a better future.
As the bird of Sankofa, looking backward while heading forward, I attempt in the
methodological and sequential outline of my dissertation, with an eye focused especially
on using what Nietzsche called a “critical” approach to history—with, of course, and
following Heidegger, still leaves both his “antiquarian” and his “monumental”
approaches in play, only now in and as background for the “critical” foreground. Using
Arendt’s imagery, we could also say that it is through the “alchemist” as critic working
magic with the residue of the past, kindling the flame of truth that continues to burn to
this day, that a feminist approach to history and philosophy works in the service of life.
Again, for Nietzsche and Rosenzweig, philosophy must necessarily aid in
promoting life. This is ever so crucial for our world today. The urgency of our world in
crisis tells us so. I assert that given our own historical context, we no longer have the
luxury to continue avoiding various crises in the world. To the extent that there is an
ethical call in philosophy, as I draw out in my “antiquarian” move to return to Nietzsche
and Rosenzweig, I do so only in preparing to become a feminist historical/philosophic
critic. I assert that in pursuing contemporary philosophy today, the following question
arises: Why hide from the truth by abusing the notion of, and claim to, purported
philosophical “mastery,” following the past through the worn out pathways that have
been traveled so many times before, to become a “master” of philosophy itself and
uphold the “rules” of philosophical truth, when the truth has become, as Nietzsche noted
during his own time, “illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are;
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metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their
pictures and now matter only as metal, no longer as coins.”15
I will now take a few moments to turn to my own philosophical journey. I do so
in the hopes that my reader will thereby come to appreciate the context within which, and
the spirit with which, my analysis in the following chapters should be taken. That
context, at one level, is the region of so-called “continental European philosophy” within
the broader realm of western philosophy in general as it emerges and is interpreted within
the Western academic philosophy of today. But I also request my reader to break free a
bit from that context, to follow me in following my own hunch--which has meanwhile
become for me richly confirmed, as I hope will also be confirmed for the sympathetic
reader who reads the chapter to come after this introductory one--there the standard
academic approach to philosophy today misses something truly crucial that is still there
to be discovered in Nietzsche’s and Rosenzweig’s great texts, something that can be
discovered precisely by reading Nietzsche through Rosenzweig, and Rosenzweig through
Nietzsche, as I will do.
Again, it is not through an interpretation of texts that reduces the flow of life and
thought as it relates to a philosopher’s writing, but in a pause, a moment to open to other
players, events, related to life, that what would be a philosophy in the service of life
evolves. In addition to my methodological concerns, I turn to introduce some new
vantage points from which to view my topic. What I suggest arises in viewing my topic,
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through the feminist lens as I propose, is the possibility that there is another character that
appears on the stage that in many ways, as I explore in my dissertation, “steals the show.”
Most specifically what I acknowledge is that through learning of interactions and specific
writings Nietzsche gives his readers regarding some of his primary philosophical
perspectives, it becomes not only helpful but mandatory to include an analysis of
Andreas-Salomé’s thoughts and life on her own as well as in relation to Nietzsche’s
writings and life.
As I explore some of Andreas-Salomé’s writings, many not yet translated into
English, I realize I need not apologize for bringing her into my reading of Nietzsche’s
text, particularly first through the lens of Rosenzweig, then as she embodies some aspect
of the hidden feminine divine I draw out of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra. I emphasize this
particular reading is most appropriate, especially noting what Nietzsche wrote in terms of
his own life experience in writing, or rather in his terms, “giving birth” to Zarathustra.
Certainly Andreas-Salomé wrote about various topics directly related and relevant
to my exploration of a certain quality of Nietzsche’s text, that is of a struggle with a
certain something, as Jacob wrestling with an angel. As I previously noted regarding
Nietzsche’s texts, it is through the struggle, and consequently through the journey
Nietzsche takes his readers on, that this particular reader wonders if his texts do not in
some ways parallel his own personal sense of awakening. To firmly establish the point
again, when I started to explore this idea, I found through an unexpected opening in these
readings – what I describe as the feminine divine.
Just as Freud was haunted by something that he could not quite put his finger on
in his Moses and Monotheism, I found on open enigma in reading Zarathustra – even as
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an open wound -- that seemed to linger with me as it did for Freud even to his death. It is
perhaps only within this opening, realizing that it, in itself, is not problematic, but it
instead actually provides the necessary opening to see, that which had been forgotten,
discarded or covered over. I sensed Andreas-Salomé as somehow connecting the Star
and Zarathustra; there appeared to my eye, not only an actual rhizome-like connection
with the major players in my philosophical narrative, that is between Nietzsche,
Rosenzweig, Freud, and the French feminist following them.16 There is also much
evidence to suggest she had something more solid than just an “anarchic” connection to
Nietzsche, Rosenzweig and Freud.
For the sake of the purposes of this dissertation, however, I chose not to focus on
an empirical historical approach, claiming philosophical influence, but again, instead on a
critical historical philosophy. Such an approach views Andreas-Salomé not in terms of
speculation concerning her being an underground, hidden, potential influence, but instead
as a major player in her own right. I wonder if in taking a pause to contemplate this as a
possibility, we may consider that it could be something more than a twist of fate, that we
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view Andreas-Salomé as the hidden “wife/sister” in terms of her relationship with
Nietzsche, and also as “mother” with regard to her relationship with psychoanalysis.
From a feminist perspective, the obvious questions arises: Why was she
underground, hidden, relegated to the murky realm of Nietzsche’s “biography,” or in
Freud’s “biography,” while her male compatriots remained above ground, visible and
therefore important? Certainly within an age of post-modernity and beyond, there are no
“universal” rules that indicate she should be relegated within the realm of speculation,
while the men she had connections with are instead viewed as providing philosophical
and psychoanalytical thought that holds power and validity to this day. Certainly there is
a gender bias here, concerning disregarding Andreas-Salomé’s life and work as well as in
disregarding how Nietzsche’s and Rosenzweig’s lives, certainly within the context of
certain of their writings, are crucial in interpreting their texts.
Rather than wallowing within some of the hermeneutical conundrums that arise
within the “hermeneutics of influence,” as I mentioned previously, I present a different
hermeneutic. In filling out an historical model not yet that of Sankofa, perhaps, but yet
on the way to it, I refer to a critical history. This is an historical model that, as I have
suggested, stresses the importance of carefully choosing and lifting that which is edifying
from the past, and bringing it toward a monumental future that necessarily depends on a
critical present. It is this critical present that comes forth in agon, as the
alchemist/magician/critic burns the dross from the present and transfigures it into gold, in
keeping the flame of truth alive.
In developing my argument, I refer to feminist philosopher and theologian Grace
Jantzen’s approach to a feminist philosophy of religion based not on death (or as I qualify
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it in terms of Rosenzweig’s philosophy: the inability to face death), but on life. Jantzen
calls for feminist philosophy of religion that involves a sense of “becoming divine,”
following Luce Irigaray’s directive. She asserts a need for a “feminist philosophy of
religion which seeks not merely to repeat the old arguments, even if in critical mode, but
to break through to new ways of thinking that may open up divine horizons.” Jantzen
continues: “If the aim of a feminist philosophy of religion is becoming divine, as Irigaray
has put it, and if this involves a projection of a female divine horizon and the
development of a new female symbolic, then such ‘openness toward the other,’ a
breakthrough to other ways of thinking and being, is indispensable.”17
To state it another way, in this dissertation I will be working with Jantzen’s insights
concerning the critical importance of developing a “feminist philosophy of religion” from
a continental feminist philosophical perspective. Furthermore my methodological
approach, as I’ve described it, functions to help question some inherent dualisms in
western thought such as reason/emotion, ideas/embodiment, male/female, self/other, etc.,
in an effort, ultimately, to move beyond them. I present a feminine divine, in fact, that
goes beyond the either/or dualism inherent in western thinking.
My approach to developing a feminist philosophy of religion is likewise grounded
within a feminist tradition which “turns on its head” notions of western metaphysics.
This is a flipping of the so-called classical western philosophical presumption that not
only emphasizes and favors reason and ideas, and, as such, is associated with a
masculinist perspective, but also devalues embodiment, birth and death and, as such, all
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of which are associated with a feminist perspective. I utilize writings of the French
feminist philosophers Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Hélène Cixous, in order to situate,
and to provide a justification for, my own aims in developing a feminist philosophy of
religion originating from a reading of Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.
Toward that end, I make note of Kristeva’s reference, as she expands upon Freud’s
writings/theory, to the maternal realm, as that time when the infant is not aware of the
separation between self and other. Kristeva develops that idea in terms that resonate with
Freud’s notion of the oceanic feeling. This is a stage in human development that has
become “abject,” in Kristeva’s terms, in western life and thought. I associate some key
passages in Rosenzweig's and Nietzsche’s texts as they relate to the maternal realm, and
argue that the result provides a ground from which to develop a contemporary feminist
philosophy of religion.
I utilize Irigaray’s notion of a feminist approach to apotheosis, or becoming divine,
as well as her manner of flipping western metaphysics on its head so as to stress life as
originating in the womb. I refer to her Speculum of the Other Woman in emphasizing her
reversal as a transvaluation of western metaphysics by re-envisioning the womb as what
is real, not, as in the comparison she makes with Plato’s allegory of the cave, the space
outside the cave. Such a paradigm indicates how what has been devalued in western
philosophical understandings, the womb associated with birth, and as a corollary with
death, may find its rightful place in western life, particularly as it is associated with a
feminine divine.
I will use Cixous’s metaphor of a laughing Medusa as representative of a silenced
woman, who in contrast to Freud’s commentary on “Medusa’s Head” not only speaks,
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but laughs. Using that image will allow me to provide a model for a feminist philosophy
of religion that finds its voice in a type of joyful jouissance, overflowing any attempt to
devalue or silence a feminine divine.
I will argue that to make room for such a feminine divine requires a total
transvaluation of metaphysics, even beyond what Irigaray alone presents. Rather than
doing philosophy from the “top down,” or a “bottom up” perspective, I suggest, the sort
of exploration I attempt into a feminine divine creates space for a new awareness not
reduced to the either/or binaries of western philosophy of religion. Surely, within the
context of the history of western philosophy of religion and theology, some philosopher’s
argue for a “top down” approach to ethics, that is, that a transcendent God establishes
moral order from above. Others, Peter Singer in particular, argue for a “bottom up”
approach, claiming to be able to provide the basis of ethics and morals by using
evolutionary theory to establish the justification for moral law.
I am not suggesting that the requisite “flip” in metaphysics be just a reversal of
God/transcendent to evolutionary theory, as one side of the ongoing dialectic, but instead,
as I will describe in more detail shortly, that it involves recognition of the feminine divine
as what we might well call a “non-dual” perspective. This particular model for a
philosophy of religion does not remain within the realm of concepts. Instead I present it
as a model that allows for both a systematic, as well as embodied, approach to a feminist
philosophy of religion, one able to establish and maintain its position in western thought,
philosophy and culture.
To the extent I succeed in my endeavor, I will not only offer a unique perspective
on Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s Zarathustra as they relate to each other, but also,
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in constructing notions of the feminine divine that have been hidden/latent in Western
philosophy and history, provide a feminist reading of the texts that moves beyond the
general confines of late nineteenth/early twentieth century Western thought. As stated
above, I find room for a feminine divine in Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra. I use the lacunae in Rosenzweig’s interpretation of Nietzsche as the
opening, not so much in the search for a “theophany,” or a face-to-face encounter of man
with God, but rather in a search for what I refer to as the face behind the face: AndreasSalomé in her writing and influence/relationship with Nietzsche as she evokes and is the
concrete embodiment, relative to Nietzsche and Rosenzweig, of the feminine divine.
Through this journey, I suggest, there is a path toward a future, based upon
philosophical and theological pursuits that include the feminine divine. At the end of the
journey, I will not be supplying a feminine divine in any type of form or formula already
familiar within religious philosophical thinking in the West. I can only promise that it
may come about through an indirect awareness – a quest for knowledge that calls for a
recognition of aporia, of the pause, the emptiness or womb out of which everything
arises. Such a feminine divine does not substitute for a lost Mother god, but instead rests
upon the experience of stopping the struggle, and facing that which has so forcefully been
denied/repressed in Western thought – as the ONLY gateway, in which to pass to see her
face. It is this “face behind the face,” as that home that we really never left – but can
finally stop avoiding and turn to see: Our divine Mother. It is only through such struggle,
agon, that we return to a home, from which we came – and truly know it for the first time.
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To give a very brief overview of the sequence of my chapters, I begin in chapter
two by emphasizing Rosenzweig’s praise, then critique, of Nietzsche. Then, in chapter
three, I defend Nietzsche, and in so doing include references to Andreas-Salomé. I bring
forward in chapter four, following a more comprehensive Sankofa model of history, ideas
concerning a contemporary feminist philosophy of religion that not only recognizes a
feminine divine, but also opens up to a sort of theosophy turned apotheosis or “becoming
divine” for women, as well as for men. Next, in chapter five, I emphasize how the
particular manner Andreas-Salomé helps uncover the feminine divine in some ways goes
beyond even my analysis of the feminine divine in chapter four. Within this trajectory, I
develop a model for feminist philosophy that can inform and lead western philosophy of
religion and theology in bringing greater awareness of the human condition, and also
greater awareness concerning how philosophy may help guide individuals and society
toward acknowledging the lost feminine. It is, therefore, a philosophy that addresses life
and death, not a philosophy based on the avoidance of death.
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Chapter Two:
Herr Nietzsche: Rosenzweig’s Wayward Disciple
In the Star, Rosenzweig refers to Nietzsche with both adoration and contempt.
Jewish philosopher Richard Cohen notes how “Rosenzweig both praises and buries
Nietzsche.”1 As Rosenzweig seems to view Nietzsche both as prototype for his “New
Thinking” as well as failing in being able to finally embody it, I offer a brief exploration
of Rosenzweig’s praise of Nietzsche, and then explore some aspects of his critique of
Nietzsche. In this chapter I not only include a section that situates Nietzsche’s
philosophy within his historical and theoretical placement in time and space, but I also
include references to some of Rosenzweig’s writing that provide openings toward what I
define as the feminine divine I will later explore through close readings of Nietzsche’s
texts. I do this in order to help clarify, as well as move forward in later chapters, how my
readings of Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s insights help open a way for a feminist
philosophy of religion applicable and appropriate for contemporary western philosophy.
My reading notes how Rosenzweig and Nietzsche complement and inform each other as
well as provide the origin for a philosophical trajectory capable of moving forward
toward a uniquely feminist form of post-modern philosophy.
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Scholars have paid little attention to a comparative analysis of Rosenzweig’s and
Nietzsche’s work. Cohen asserts that even though Nietzsche does not appear to figure
prominently in Rosenzweig’s Star, Nietzsche may in fact stand as a source of inspiration,
if not Derridian spur, for Rosenzweig's entire text and thinking.
Cohen notes that the three references Rosenzweig makes to Nietzsche in the Star “appear
precisely at the book’s three pivotal points in the introduction to its three parts.”2 I
support Cohen in contending that, as Rosenzweig indicates by placing his references to
Nietzsche in the introductions to the three main parts, Nietzsche acts as a tacit guide,
marking a shift in Rosenzweig’s thinking at critical junctures in his text.
Rosenzweig’s references to Nietzsche in the three introductions follow a pattern
Cohen describes in the following manner: “Nietzsche’s first appearance in the Star is
positive, his second is both positive and negative, and his third appearance is negative.”3
Cohen himself focuses on the first and third reference, paying special attention to the last
“critical” assessment where Rosenzweig describes Nietzsche as ultimately falling short in
fully embodying Rosenzweig’s “New Thinking.”
Concerning a reading of the Star and Zarathustra, I begin by focusing attention to
the first positive reference to Nietzsche, establishing Rosenzweig’s persuasive and unique
perspective on Nietzsche. I then focus on the more negative references to Nietzsche as
the crux of my analysis. I go beyond Cohen’s reading to suggest that there is more to
Nietzsche’s thinking than Rosenzweig himself considered. I suggest this is the point
where Rosenzweig shares in Nietzsche’s philosophy of “agon,” or struggle, in allowing
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for ambiguity, paradox, or antimony in his analysis. Even as Rosenzweig seems unable
to appreciate the profundity of Nietzsche’s text, both men attempt to reach toward a
wisdom that cannot be captured in words. I suggest that what appears to be a divergence
in perspectives for both authors in fact leads to a similar moment, one that leads toward
an experience of a feminine divine.
Rosenzweig ultimately charges Nietzsche with not being able to succeed in setting
forth a philosophy that Rosenzweig envisioned would fully engage and fulfill his “New
Thinking.” There is a gap in Rosenzweig’s analysis, in that even as he critiques
Nietzsche for in the end not fulfilling Rosenzweig’s call for a “New Thinking,” he never
provides enough to sustain his critique. In chapter three, through further exploration of
Nietzsche’s philosophy I assert that rather than failing in a comprehensive philosophical
paradigm such as Rosenzweig attempts in his own life and work, Nietzsche in fact
answers Rosenzweig’s call for a more practical, integral, or even therapeutic philosophy
for life.
Rosenzweig on Nietzsche: Behold the Man As Philosopher
It is helpful to note the overall theme of each of the three main parts of the Star
initially in order to understand better the potential significance of Nietzsche’s influence
on Rosenzweig’s thought. Part One of the Star entitled “The Elements or the Everenduring Proto-cosmos” refers to the ground or foundation in Rosenzweig’s overall
movement in the Star, that is from death to life, or from the philosophical tenants of
German Idealism toward his “New Thinking.” Part Two entitled “The Course: or the
Always-renewed Cosmos” refers to the course or path toward a type of liberatory
philosophy. Part Three entitled “The Configuration or the Eternal Hyper-Cosmos” refers
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to the fruitional aspect of his philosophy, as it moves toward entering into a type of
philosophical promised land.
In structuring the three parts of the Star as they function in mapping out the
progression of his over-arching theme, Rosenzweig's begins the text with the phrase ”All
cognition of the All originates in death, in the fear of death.”4 He completes the text of
the whole Star with the phrase “Into Life.”5 Rosenzweig entitles the introduction to Part
One: “On the Possibility of the Cognition of the All.” In it Rosenzweig extols Nietzsche’s
philosophical prowess in breaking free from the Socratic philosopher. Rosenzweig finds
Nietzsche emblematic of what Rosenzweig referred to as a “philosopher as man.”
Rosenzweig describes Nietzsche as not relying upon tradition alone in his philosophy.
Nietzsche was creative in his philosophical endeavors. What he wrote was original, at
least as far as it differed from the philosophical trajectory Rosenzweig lays out from
“Iona to Jena.” The manner in which Rosenzweig suggests that Nietzsche may be a
potential harbinger of Rosenzweig’s own “new thinking” stems from an image of
Nietzsche stepping away from the German Idealist penchant for using philosophical
understanding in terms of mental mastery and control. Rosenzweig finds this type of
philosophy to be deadening. Rosenzweig also associates such philosophical mastery with
using thinking to avoid that which is most difficult to face: death.
Thus, Rosenzweig finds Nietzsche to be emblematic of a “philosopher as man” able
to break from conventional philosophical thinking, to come into his own in terms of his
ability to address what authentic human existence may entail, and to go beyond the
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confines of the western metaphysical tradition in general -- in other words, to step out of
the matrix of philosophy as “cognition of the All.” Rosenzweig writes of traditional
philosophy as being akin to an unnatural death. Philosophical writing becomes a form of
suicide, firstly as it reduces all mystery and majesty of life into thoughts or concepts, and
secondly as it functions to help avoid facing death.
In this first reference to Nietzsche, Rosenzweig describes Nietzsche as an
individual who speaks against “the philosophers,” and exhibits what a more authentic
mastery of philosophy entails. In describing Nietzsche, Rosenzweig writes: “Man as
philosophizer [has] become master of philosophy—not as translated into mental terms,
but as endowed with a soul, whose mind seemed to him only the frozen breath of his
living soul.”6
Additionally Rosenzweig notes the tendency of the philosophers of German
Idealism to favor thinking over speech. Nietzsche exemplifies a break from such a
philosophy, as is evident in the title of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Rosenzweig
commends Nietzsche in these passages. In this way, Nietzsche does indeed function as a
harbinger of Rosenzweig's “New Thinking.” Rather than representing a philosopher who
writes philosophy as a pre-thought-out monologue, Nietzsche’s Zarathustra speaks first
as a living soul, addressing what is relevant in his journey and standing at any given
moment. His is a philosophy of dialogue, based on the I-thou model of
philosophical/theological discourse; he is a representative of Rosenzweig’s Sprachdenken
(speech-thinking), even if only, for Rosenzweig, as I will explore shortly, it arises
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through what Rosenzweig suggests is a “pagan” source as the inspiration for Nietzsche’s
writings.
In support of Nietzsche, Rosenzweig evokes the Faustian: “Philosophy had
promised to give him compensation in the form of mind in return for selling it his soul . .
. .”7 As Nietzsche seems able to break free from conventional dualistic idealisms such as
soul/mind, order/disorder, morality/immorality, good/evil, and at least according to his
own perspective masculine/feminine, he does not succumb to the temptation of so many
of the German Idealists, that of ‘selling his soul’ to German Idealism as it symbolically
functions in the role of Mephistopheles in Goethe’s Faust. According to Rosenzweig,
therefore, Nietzsche was not tempted by the devil’s deal.8
Before I turn to a more thorough exploration of Rosenzweig’s assessment of
Nietzsche, however, I will make a few preliminary comments on Nietzsche as he is
situated in the history of western philosophy as well as qualify certain points concerning
the comparison between Nietzsche and Goethe’s Faust. I do so in order to provide
additional historical and theoretical grounding for Rosenzweig’s praise, and then critique
of Nietzsche.
Nietzsche in the “Age of Spiritual Reproduction”
As I have noted, for Rosenzweig, Nietzsche’s philosophical path was altogether
different from those that came before him. He appeared undaunted in seeking to go
beyond and break free from conventional thinking. Ambiguity arises in making a
7
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in contrast to Rosenzweig’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s relationship to the Faustian
legend, some interpreters view Thomas Mann in his Doktor Faustus as suggesting
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comparison between Faust and Nietzsche, however. Nietzsche’s life does appear in some
respects to resemble Faust in that Nietzsche seemed never satisfied with what he had and
with what he knew; Nietzsche seemed to be always longing for more, to climb higher and
higher mountains. Yet I find there to be a difference between Nietzsche and the Faustian
model. Unlike Faust, Nietzsche didn’t appear to favor a Promethean-bound longing
made manifest as insatiable desire over forgetting his origins, or the past. He valued the
past; he addressed the significance of historiography in many of his writings.
In functioning in the role of historical “critic,” to use the term Hannah Arendt does
of in her introduction to Walter Benjamin’s Illuminations, Nietzsche was intrigued with
returning to the Greeks. Even though he tended to present Plato as a foil to his
philosophical perspectives, I find it relevant that Nietzsche made multiple references to
Plato. Nietzsche appeared to be in agon, grappling with Plato’s core ideas. I argue
Nietzsche seemed to be working through some of Plato’s major philosophical
assumptions in his own work. If, as Rosenzweig would agree, Plato is the forbearer of
western metaphysics, favoring the search for the ideal form or essence as truth over
embodied life, Nietzsche would certainly in turn proclaim the value of retaining an
emphasis on embodied life over a search for a transcendent ideal essence.
Even as Nietzsche seemed motivated to seek higher and higher ground, his
recognition of the importance of the origins of his philosophical thought tempered his
desire to go beyond conventional norms. For example, in his first and much-anticipated
major philosophical work The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche focused on Greek tragedy. In
this text he worked toward an integration of opposites in Greek drama, that of the
Dionysian and the Apollonian. Here Nietzsche explored the seemingly ubiquitous,
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ongoing assumption of western philosophy of a dualistic perspective in art criticism, that
of a dichotomy between creative energy and form. For Nietzsche great art depends upon
a skillful integration of the creative impulse associated with spirit and will, and the skill
and discipline needed to organize and harness creativity. I note that the notion of spirit
for Nietzsche is less in terms of spirit as it may be associated with religious piety and
purity, and more in the sense of Henri Bergson’s élan vital. Even as Nietzsche wrote the
Birth of Tragedy early in his writing career, his references to the Dionysian contain the
seed of what would become his notion of the will to power.
Nietzsche was not advocating a simple elevation of the Dionysian over the
Apollonian, however. The Apollonian form was also important for Nietzsche. He
acknowledged the importance of the stunning majesty Apollo represented in relation to
great artwork. Form provided the means one may use to harness the at times chaotic yet
potent energy of the Dionysian. When both come together through skillful integration,
the Dionysian can instill depth to an otherwise superficial, banal art based only on proper
or ideal form alone. As I will explore in later chapters, the Dionysian, but more
specifically the will to power, in many ways is associated with the feminine for
Nietzsche; his ultimate notion of the divine, therefore, Therefore I will argue, does not
favor the Apollonian male God, nor the Dioynsian female God, but a skillful integration
of the two.
Nietzsche not only emphasizes the need to return to the Greeks in The Birth of
Tragedy, he also attempts a return of sorts in Zarathustra, utilizing the name of a figure
associated with an even earlier point in time in Zoroastrianism. Conventional historical
approaches to Zoroastrianism identify it as the movement that first created a sense of
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duality between good and evil. Judaism and Islam both arose during this time;
Zoroastrianism influenced both traditions. Nietzsche appears to be seeking not so much
the origin, but a beginning to what he finds plagues western philosophy and theology,
that of dividing good from evil, light from dark, right from wrong, etc. Returning to this
time for Nietzsche is quite a radical move. He returns to the roots of dualistic thinking in
the west in order declare a more nuanced and potentially transformational thinking that
goes “beyond good and evil.”
Ecce Homo: Philosopher as Man or Man as Philosopher?
For Rosenzweig, Nietzsche’s philosophical path was altogether different from those
that came before him. To Rosenzweig, Nietzsche appeared undaunted in seeking to go
beyond and break free from conventional thinking including a dualistic approach to
reality. Rosenzweig asserts Nietzsche was not split by such dichotomies: “For Nietzsche
[the] dichotomy between height and plane did not exist in his own self: he was a piece,
soul and mind a unity, man and thinker a unity to the last.”9
In the section “Metaethics” Rosenzweig describes Nietzsche as one able to
transcend another dichotomy, the one between a “world-view” and life. Rosenzweig
considers how Nietzsche opens a “new world . . . unlocked to reason . . . lying beyond the
orbit described by ethics.”10 It is crucial to note that for Rosenzweig, Nietzsche does not
open the new world unlocked to reason and beyond ethics as a conceptual thinker.
Rosenzweig suggests there is something radically unique to Nietzsche's philosophy.
Nietzsche philosophizes as an individual human being, “a prosopographically determined
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being, [one who] stepped out of the world which knew itself as the conceivable world,
out of the All of philosophy.”11
Furthermore, I suggest that there are three common attributes between Nietzsche
and Rosenzwieg -- that of working against or in opposition to the past, (for Nietzsche this
means mainly against Kant and for Rosenzweig this means mainly against Hegel) having
an ability to articulate philosophical meditations on truth in a manner that invites the
audience to recall literary and artistic references to unveil the philosophical import of
what they are reading, and lastly to do this in such a manner as to incorporate bodily
understanding, through a type of experiential knowledge. Thus, both Nietzsche and
Rosenzweig philosophize in a manner that, following the formulation of contemporary
French philosopher and historian of philosophy Pierre Hadot12 reflects, not so much a life
devoted to philosophy, as a philosophy able to enhance life. The first of the common
attributes, that of working against Kant, Hegel and German Idealism, I unpack in this
chapter. The second attribute involving the use of a more literary approach to
philosophical truth, I was able to highlight in my introduction. I focus on the last
common attribute, that of “writing with blood,” according to Nietzsche’s own selfdescriptive phrase, that of incorporating all of one’s embodied being, in chapters three
and four, as I relate such an emphasis on an embodied philosophy with a feminist
approach to philosophical understanding.
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Rosenzweig’s Critique of Nietzsche
Due to the fact that Nietzsche’s philosophical thinking arises as from “a
prosopographically determined being,” Nietzsche embodies Rosenzweig’s thought. What
becomes problematic for Rosenzweig, however, is that for Nietzsche, his subjectivity is
paramount such that it may not only lead toward a type of solipsism but it also becomes
impervious to methodology. Clearly a contemporary reader of Nietzsche’s text finds
Rosenzweig’s critique false when one considers Nietzsche’s emphasis on the need for
Apollonian form as it functions in the important role that discipline, structure, and
method play, along with what one may qualify as the subjective as Dionysian, in being
able to attempt a philosophy as life. Nonetheless, in contrast to how he views Nietzsche’s
shortcoming, Rosenzweig stresses the need for a clear-cut “methodology” as he
emphasizes the notion of a “path,” or course as the main theme of Part Two of the Star.
This is keeping in line with Rosenzweig’s implicit focus on the importance of systematic
thinking.13
Additionally, Rosenzweig criticizes theologians at a crucial juncture in the history
of western philosophy and theology, roughly around 1800, for using science to sustain
theology’s survival into modernity. Rosenzweig sees the loss of the true
divine/miraculous/ revelation in a theology that relies too heavily upon scientific
means/method. What Rosenzweig calls for is a philosopher able to bridge both embodied
subjectivity and the appropriate methodology, associated not with scientific method, but
13
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instead with divine revelation. In fact for Rosenzweig there could be no other model for
a philosopher that could revive the western philosophical tradition.
Although Rosenzweig admired Nietzsche for fulfilling the role of a “point of view
philosopher,” Nietzsche couldn’t provide the ultimate model in Rosenzweig’s view
because Rosenzweig also stressed the need for revelation to guide philosophy’s hand. As
Nietzsche seemed to be void of any belief in God, Rosenzweig may have assumed that
Nietzsche was, therefore, simply unable to receive revelation, at least not from a truly
divine source. For Rosenzweig, Nietzsche was too subjective, and his ideas perhaps
stemmed from a questionable source of revelation. Again, Rosenzweig felt that
Nietzsche did not pay sufficient attention to method/science, or that which is associated
with submission to divine or secular/philosophical/scientific “law,” in order to receive
“true” revelation.
Cohen provides his summation of Rosenzweig's perspective on Nietzsche in the
following manner:
While Rosenzweig applauds Nietzsche for escaping the empty abstractions of
Hegelian philosophy, for posing a philosophizing subjectivity against philosophical
objectivity, he criticizes Nietzsche for escaping Hegelianism in the wrong way, or,
rather, for escaping Hegelianism in the right way but insufficiently.
Cohen follows Rosenzweig in critiquing Nietzsche for being “pagan.” For Rosenzweig,
Nietzsche’s paganism is insufficient. It is inferior to “Goethe’s pagan individualism.”
But of most significance to Rosenzweig, are the problems he has with paganism in
general. For Rosenzweig, Cohen writes, the “pagan option . . . is inferior to the revealed
religious alternative offered by Christianity and Judaism.”14 Cohen highlights the
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ambiguity in Rosenzweig's thought about Nietzsche: even as Nietzsche was able to step
aside from the historical philosophical trajectory, for Rosenzweig Nietzsche does not
receive true divine revelation, that power that enhances and uplifts the merely human
status and makes it more than human. As such, Rosenzweig states that Nietzsche cannot
be open to the miraculous in human life and understanding.
Rosenzweig Opening to a Feminine Divine?
Rosenzweig ultimately critiqued Nietzsche as falling short, even as he had found in
Nietzsche hope for the embodiment of his own “new thinking.” I will follow through to
defend Nietzsche against Rosenzweig's critique in chapter three where I suggest that
Nietzsche does in fact write through and about divine revelation, it is just that the source
is not from what Rosenzweig would consider to be the true divine.
Before I explore, in chapter three, some aspects of how Nietzsche, although
seeming to fall short of Rosenzweig’s "New Thinking," may in fact begin to fulfill it, I
pause to note some aspects of Rosenzweig’s writings that tantalizingly indicate an
opening to what I call the feminine divine. There are certain passages in the Star that that
I will highlight in order to lay the groundwork for my defense of Nietzsche against
Rosenzweig's critique.
In Part One, Rosenzweig attempts not so much to return back to the “essence” of
being, as such, for this is the task of the German Idealist. He instead emphasizes a return
to what he describes as the basic elements of God, World, and Humanity. Rosenzweig
wants the ground of his philosophical trajectory to be based on real world elements. He
is not concerned with the essence of reality, but reality itself. He does this by focusing on
the real world elements God, World, and Humanity as the fundamentals of reality. In not
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focusing on the essence of things he deals with time and with death. He deals with God,
World, and Humanity as they function in mortal and everyday life.
Originating in Rosenzweig’s attempts to materialize what has become “immaterial’
in western philosophical thinking, there arises a point of contention between Rosenzweig
and Nietzsche. It is striking to note that even as Rosenzweig begins the Star with a
reference to death or what one may call non-existence or emptiness, he does not fully
elaborate upon the topic. Instead he quickly returns to the fundamentals God, World, and
Humanity as the “beginning,” or fundamental building blocks from which reality arises
as the ground of being. This is a point where exploring some tangents in Nietzsche’s
thought may help actually flesh out Rosenzweig’s thinking. I will do this in chapter three
where I indicate that my reading of Nietzsche suggests his insights define what a time
before time--a time before the basics, God, World, and Humanity-- may entail, in both an
ontological as well as cosmological sense.
Clearly death and birth are related in Rosenzweig’s approach to being and
philosophy. Although there are multiple and various ways one may parse out this
relationship, one very elemental way is to recognize Rosenzweig as suggesting that one
must face death, in order to truly live a new beginning or rebirth. Again, as Rosenzweig
attempts to move away from the natural penchant for philosophers in the western
philosophical and theological tradition to seek for some elusive and immaterial essence as
truth, he instead focuses on what he views as the fundamental elements God, World, and
Humanity. In so doing, however, he does not present a thoroughgoing approach to death,
at least not from an experiential perspective. In relation to this omission within the
context of my argument, two questions arise: What is this non-existence or emptiness that
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life not only returns to, but also arises from? Could Nietzsche’s thought embody a
recognition of just such a return to emptiness and arising, and embody it in ways that
Rosenzweig may have missed?
Rosenzweig demonstrates his concern that German Idealism has “throw[n] off the
fear of things earthly.” It is most important to note what he means by his use of the word
“earthly.” He describes the earthly in a manner that evokes a connection as well as
tension between death and birth—and, as a corollary, the feminine—in relation to the
earth: “Without ceasing, the womb of the indefatigable earth gives birth to what is new,
each bound to die, each awaiting the day of its journey into darkness with fear and
trembling.” The earthly is associated with all things mortal, this would be birth as well as
death. For Rosenzweig, philosophy “denies these fears of the earth.” He describes the
earth as being associated with death as an abyss, from which the “free soul flutters away
over . . . .”15
Rosenzweig seeks to face death, and I suggest facing death is aligned with facing
birth, both of which seem to be aligned with the feminine in the context of the history of
western philosophy that itself would function to enact an “unnatural” death. He suggests
that in acknowledging that which has been associated with the feminine and in many
ways dismissed in western culture, birth and death, there arises support for a type of
dualism, that between birth/death or the body, and the eternal/infinite or the soul. In this
split, the body goes the way of the earth, and “the free soul flutters away over . . . [the
abyss].”16 Rosenzweig articulates a juxtaposition here, between an integrated body and

15
16

Ibid., 1.
Ibid.
43

soul as it faces death, and western philosophy’s facile attempt to avoid death through a
type of de-animated living.
As a fundamental point in the Star, Rosenzweig states what would become the
quintessential existential position, and German Idealism’s response to it:
Let man creep like a worm into the folds of the naked earth before the fastapproaching volleys of a blind death from which there is no appeal; let him sense
there, forcibly, inexorably, what he otherwise never senses: that this I would be but
an It if it died; let him therefore cry his very I out with every cry that is still in his
throat against Him from whom there is no appeal, from whom such unthinkable
annihilation threatens—for all this dire necessity philosophy has only its vacuous
smile.
I assert Rosenzweig makes a conclusion, not so much associating death with
nothingness, but in rendering it as “no ultimate conclusion but a first beginning.”
Rosenzweig appears to allude to something of substance in death, it is neither nothing,
nor an “ultimate conclusion”; instead it is a “first beginning.” Initially Rosenzweig states
that death is not what it seems, he then goes on to indicate that it is in fact irrefutable and
cannot “be done away with.”17 What death truly is, however, that ultimate truth that
somehow appears connected with birth or life, Rosenzweig does not explicitly define. I
suggest that Nietzsche again, as I introduce this thought here and will further explore in
chapter three, may in fact help demonstrate a type of experiential understanding of what
facing death, and as its corollary life, entails.
It is significant that Rosenzweig does briefly refer to a type of nothingness as “not
Nought,” but more in terms of a type of emptiness associated with the fecundity of a
womb, or, as Rosenzweig describes it, in terms of the earth as origin. This is the point
where, I suggest, Rosenzweig writes of the earth as womb/origin in ways that may
17
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resonate with a feminine divine. There are inklings of what one may call the
“primordial” in his discourse. He unveils a reference to a type of feminine divine, yet
also he seems to veil its significance as he couches it in terms of another tradition: one of
the traditions of Chinese philosophy, namely, Taoism. It is nonetheless a significant
point he makes; it is one that I will suggest is related to some aspects of Nietzsche’s
thinking as well as some French feminist analysis following him in relation to developing
a more fully fleshed out feminine divine.
In referring to Taoism in Part One, Rosenzweig describes the Tao as nothingness,
yet also as the origin of everything. Rosenzweig approaches this particular “ground of
being” as it relates to Chinese thought: “The Tao effects without acting, it is a god who
keeps ‘quite as a mouse’ so that the world can move around him.” Rosenzweig
continues:
It is entirely without essence; nothing exists in it in the way that every self, for
example ‘exists’ in the Brahma. Rather it itself exists in everything . . . to use the
analogy of the Upanishads, in the way the salt crystals exist in a solution [:] . . . in
the way that the hub exists in the spokes, as the window exists in the wall, or the
empty space in a vessel. It is that which, by being ‘nothing,’ makes a something
useful, the unmoved mover of the movable. It is the non-act as the basis of act.18
Even as he brings it up, he appears quickly to dismiss this evocative reference to a
“time before” temporal or mortal existence. So too does Rosenzweig appear to applaud
Nietzsche as one able to break from the philosophical “cognition of the All,” only then to
begin to discount his philosophical perspectives. Be that as it may however, it is clear
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that, for all his praise of Nietzsche in the introduction to Part One of the Star which
focuses on the need to transgress traditional and historical approaches to western
philosophy/metaphysics, in the introduction to Part Two Rosenzweig provides a clear
shift from praising to critiquing Nietzsche.
Divine Origin from Above or from Below
There is much to explore in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra that sheds light on
Nietzsche’s particular form of philosophical discourse as it arises from within Nietzsche
the man rather than from God. Nietzsche’s narrative style itself is revelatory; his text
functions as oracle. This stands in marked contrast to Rosenzweig’s approach to
revelation. As I’ve noted, for Rosenzweig, revelation must come from God. There is no
other source for revelation. Nietzsche’s “revelation” for Rosenzweig must necessarily be
associated with “earth” religion, or paganism, and therefore demeaned and dismissed.
Rosenzweig may approach this in terms reminiscent of what he calls the Nought. I argue
that Nietzsche's source of revelation comes not from the Nought, but more from a place
of creativity I associate with the emptiness Rosenzweig alluded to in Taoist thought, but
did not expand upon. This emptiness I align with the feminine divine.
This is a source that, within the context of cultural, philosophical and theological
assumptions that identify divinity as purely masculine, arises instead from another
legitimate source of divinity. This is a divine source that may resemble paganism or
earth-worship such that the “revelator” receives not from “above,” but from “below.”
Rather than view the earth/paganism as “fallen” from the true source of the divine, using
Nietzsche as a guide, it is possible to enact a transvaluation of paganism as well as a
transvaluation of a masculinist approach to divinity.
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It is crucial to emphasize that this other source, just because it is not from the
Father God from above, need not be reduced to ‘darkness,’ heathenism or sorcery, thus
propagating the split between eternalism and nihilism. This other type of divinity, as I
have suggested, provides support for a feminine divine as we may identify it through in a
double reading of Rosenzweig and Nietzsche’s texts. It is a source of divinity not coming
from the traditional god of western theologians as noted, just as Nietzsche’s philosophy
did not come from the traditional “gods” of western philosophy. This fact alone does not
warrant excluding it as a source of authentic revelation, however; it may instead provide
a way that could help show how the divine may not only begin to work through the
relationship of God, world, and humanity, but in fact has already been doing so. There is
no recovery of the feminine divine at work here, only recognition that it has always been
present. Even as such, it is understandable that for Rosenzweig, there begins to be a
chink in Nietzsche’s philosophical armor.
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Chapter Three:
Feminine Divine: Facing the Nought and Becoming Übermensch
he walks with me
to the gate of Home and leaves me.
I enter.
Denise Levertov1
[I am] already dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and become old.
Friedrich Nietzsche, Ecce Homo2
In the preceding chapter, my defense of Nietzsche against Rosenzweig’s claim
that Nietzsche eventually falls short of Rosenzweig’s “New Thinking,” I use Goethe,
particularly Goethe’s notions of the feminine in Faust, to cast Nietzsche in a different
light. In this chapter, after exploring an approach to the feminine in Faust that includes
both an idealized version of the “eternal feminine” as well as a terrifying, yet powerful
feminine divine in the “realm of the mothers,” I assert that Nietzsche’s Zarathustra
includes a similar approach to feminine divine revelation. In doing close readings of
some passages in Zarathustra, Ecce Homo and Will to Power, a collection of writings
from Nietzsche’s notebook that his sister Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche later collected and
published, I use Goethe to support Nietzsche against Rosenzweig. In addition, I propose
that it is also of interest to see how some of Nietzsche’s philosophical writings are
1
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mirrored in his actual encounters with Lou Andreas-Salomé. I include some references to
their interactions and also to some of Andreas-Salomé’s writings to support this
proposition.
Before moving to explore key passages in Nietzsche’s texts that support my claim
for a hidden feminine divine, I turn to Goethe as a writer who dominated German
literature and culture during Rosenzweig and Nietzsche’s lifetime. Both Rosenzweig and
Nietzsche refer to Goethe’s Faust in the Star and Zarathustra, respectively. I suggest
that in Goethe’s Faust, Goethe adds complexity as well as ambiguity in his references to
the feminine. It was just such a complexity that I want to suggest Nietzsche picked up
upon and developed.
Nietzsche and the Feminine
Nietzsche begins the first chapter, “Why I am so Wise,” of his “autobiography”
Ecce Homo with the following statement: “The good fortune of my existence, its
uniqueness perhaps, lies in its fatality: I am, to express it in the form of a riddle, already
dead as my father, while as my mother I am still living and becoming old.”3 Nietzsche in
a sense embodies both Rosenzweig’s notion first of facing death, and second, of moving
from death to life: Nietzsche declares his father, as Jean Graybeal comments, “with
whom he strongly identifies, . . . is dead, above life, detached and safe.” His mother, on
the other hand “lives on, grows old, continues to give birth to himself . . . .”4
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During Nietzsche’s time the male patriarchal God of theology and the “gods” of
western philosophical thought were both indeed “dead.” Yet I highlight the point that
Nietzsche’s famous statement may not end with the iteration he first wrote in the Gay
Science: “God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”5 Nietzsche instead
would add to this statement, asserting that not only is the male God dead, but the female
god/mother lives on. I suggest that the two statements are intertwined for Nietzsche.
On my reading, Nietzsche’s assertion about the death of God does not lead to
nihilism as is commonly understood, but rather in the spirit of Virginia Woolf’s
admonition to “kill the angel in the house,” toward a notion of a feminine divine as the
“eternal feminine” that “lives on, grows old, [and] continues to give birth . . . .” On my
reading Nietzsche harks back to Goethe’s Faust in this passage. Nietzsche notes that any
type of transformation or transfiguration must come about not through what William
James may have labeled the “once-born” concerning religious devotion, but instead the
“twice-born.” I refer to James’s Varieties of Religious Experience to make my point.
James describes “two ways of life which are characteristic respectively of what we called
the healthy-minded, who need to be born only once, and of the sick souls who must be
twice-born in order to be happy.”6 Nietzsche certainly would be of the twice-born type,
needing as he does, first to descend in Goethe’s terms, to the “realm of the mothers”
before being saved by the “eternal feminine.”
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A religion based on a father God supports the penchant of western philosophy to
seek a cognition of the All Rosenzweig critiques. In order to explain what I suggest was
Rosenzweig’s approach to the mystical All in terms of a feminist philosophy of religion, I
refer to a feminine divine that is associated with stereotypical references to maternal love
rather than paternal justice. Yet, the feminine divine goes beyond such facile gender
valuations; it is a love that overflows and also originates in the realm of the mother. I
assert it unfolds through a type of recognition of the maternal realm both in individual
development as well as in the trajectory of western thought in general. Yet, I also
emphasize it has to do with a going beyond gender characteristics altogether. On-going
and throughout my analysis I will suggest it is through first a recognition of the maternal
that one is able to transgress dualisms between mother and father divine.
It is worth emphasizing that what I refer to as the maternal realm is not like
common notions of the “eternal feminine” during the nineteenth century, offering only
models of a one-dimensional idealized feminine. Most interpreters of Goethe associate
the “eternal feminine” with an overly romanticized version of what Virginia Woolf called
the “angel in the house.”7 I assert that Goethe provided references for the feminine,
however, that included both this “positive” representation of the feminine, as well as a
more frightening feminine in what he called the “realms of the mothers.” I claim that it is
this very dynamic between the two aspects of the feminine, one that Goethe first most
clearly articulated, that I find in Nietzsche’s and Rosenzweig’s later writings.
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Goethe writes about a descent to the Realm of the Mothers associated with the
Nought. Mephistopheles speaks in Goethe’s first reference to the “Realm of the
Mothers” in “Dark Gallery”:
I loathe to touch on more exalted riddle. –
Goddesses sit enthroned in reverend loneliness,
Space is as naught about them, time is less;
The very mention of them is distress.
They are—the Mothers.
As a uniquely Goethean version of a most abysmal thought, Faust responds: “The
Mothers! Still it strikes a shock of fear. / What is this word that I loathe to hear?8
Goethe opens a realm of the feminine that instills fear and trembling. In such a
depiction, the “angel in the house” does not appear. This is a realm that involves
trembling, but also respect. Nietzsche’s moment of integration is as “the moment” we
read of in Faust’s final speech before he dies. It is “a moment” but also a space that
evokes a maternal origin. Goethe’s Faust describes this moment as one that includes both
fullness and emptiness; it is one of fecundity, as well as, with Mephistopheles
immediately following Faust’s speech with a reference to the Eternal-empty, nothingness.
Through Goethe’s Faust Goethe plants a seed for Nietzsche. In Faust’s final speech
Goethe implies that in death comes an opportunity to face the Eternal–Empty, along with
its accompanying Eternal-Feminine.
In reference to an earlier version of Faust’s final speech, Goethe writes:
From the ditch, which crawls through swamps
And finally reaches the sea.
I win a place for many millions
There will I also dwell among them,
Stand truly upon my own ground and earth.
8
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I may say to the moment
Oh, tarry yet, thou art so fair!
The trace of my earthly days can
Never in eons disappear.9
Goethe expresses Faust’s moment of recognition as the highest moment in contrast to
Mephistopheles declaring death as Naught as a form of total nothingness and nihilism:
It is over! How to read this clause?
All over is as good as never was,
And yet it whirls about as if it were.
The Eternal-Empty is what I prefer.10
The devil would have one think that death is nothingness. This mirrors classical
readings of Nietzsche’s claim that “God is dead” as also a form of nihilism. I suggest
instead that the death of god as Nietzsche declares it, is not associated with nihilism, but
as a necessary prerequisite for the feminine divine to take her place in history.
I demonstrate this in referring to the above quoted passage where Mephistopheles
states: “It is over!” as a demonic parody of Christ’s last words: “It is finished.” Goethe to
some extent offers a transvaluation of the crucifixion, one that may appear to be Nought,
but in reality leads to redemption. The redemption does not begin with God the Heavenly
Father, but arises only from a recognition of the loss of this God as necessary in order to
unveil a particular source of strength and illumination from a feminine divine. Just as
Rosenzweig may assert not a negation of the all, but a positive affirmation of the nonNought – here too is there hope for a continuing on, for life, for re-birth. Nietzsche also
addresses such a moment in his Zarathustra that I find to be a critical turning point in the
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narrative in a manner that may be suggestive as both a postscript for Goethe’s moment in
facing death, but also as a precursor for Rosenzweig’s affirmation of the non-Nought.
Hamlin notes the section immediately preceding Faust’s death scene is entitled
“’Midnight,’ indicat[ing] a sense of moment at the turning point from the night toward
new day.”11 Goethe seems to be suggesting something other than what may be deduced
through dualistic notions of death verses life, darkness verses life, etc. He refers to the
“Realm of the Mothers” in terms that resonate with what I will explore as Nietzsche’s
“most abysmal thought,” that of the eternal recurrence. Goethe describes them through
Mephistopheles’s voice:
A glowing tripod will at last give sign
That you have reached the deepest, nethermost shrine;
And by its light you will behold the Mothers;
Some may be seated, upright, walking others,
As it may chance. Formation, transformation,
The eternal mind’s eternal recreation,
Enswathed in likenesses of manifold entity; . . . .12
Inherent in Goethe’s account is an opening to time eternal. The ever-recurring life that
winds only along the same track eternally. I will explain this notion in Goethe later in the
chapter, in Nietzsche’s reference to the eternal return.
There is a sense of integration in what Nietzsche presents in relation to a feminine
divine, one that involves, as he writes in Ecce Homo:
. . . a dual descent, as it were, both from the highest and the lowest rung on the
ladder of life, at the same time a decadent and a beginning—this, if anything,
explains that neutrality, that freedom from all partiality in relation to the total
problem of life, that perhaps distinguishes me. I have a subtler sense of smell for
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the signs of ascent and decline than any other human being before me; I am the
teacher par excellence for this—I know both, I am both.13
At the turning point of the structural approach to overcoming, as Nietzsche presents it, in
this passage, Nietzsche describes the arising of an influx, when the father descending and
the mother ascending meet. In this union, Nietzsche finds himself embodied. He
personifies the crossing point in the structure. Nietzsche breaks through at this crossing
point. This break-through is a precursor to his notion of amor fati, accepting sweetness
and light as well as chaos and pain through integrating and not only accepting, but also
loving both, Nietzsche enters into a world of love. Clearly for Nietzsche this
transformative experience is associated, just as in Goethe’s Faust, with love and also with
what I am calling the feminine divine.
I associate this feminine divine with love; it is a love that may be as strong as
Rosenzweig's reference to love; but it is a love that does not depend or rely upon a
transcendent God above, but instead on an integration of the transcendent and the
immanent I associate with the feminine divine. As in the above quoted passage from
Ecce Homo Nietzsche refers to an integration that includes not only facing death, but also
“going beyond” dualisms such as the ideal and material, the Apollonian and Dionysian,
the male and female, and the father and mother. It is in and through this turning point
that Nietzsche refers to a critical moment in time going “beyond good and evil”; for in it
he embodies going beyond traditional thinking, and embodies, I argue, Rosenzweig’s
“new thinking.”
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I associate Nietzsche’s “going beyond” with notions of a feminine divine; it is
through an experience of non-duality related to recognizing attributes of a still living
feminine divine that existed before the split between self and other, and with the
attendant dualisms following the initial split. I utilize a reference Freud wrote of, known
as the recapitulation theory, “ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” in reference to this
initial split: there was a time in our “evolutionary” history, just as there was a time in our
individual lives, when perception of self splits off from the primal all from which being
arises. Not only did Nietzsche’s writings include a hidden but potent feminine divine for
his time, but he also provided western philosophy with a seed for its collective and
eventual overcoming. Nietzsche reflects Goethe here: Nietzsche’s moment of “going
beyond” equates with “the moment” I alluded to earlier in Faust’s final speech before he
dies.
As with Goethe’s Faust’s transformative “moment” arising after the descent into
the “realm of the mothers,” Nietzsche begins the section before he writes of his own
transformative “moment” so as to mark it as a critical turning point both in Zarathustra’s
journey and in Nietzsche’s text. Nietzsche begins the section “The Wanderer” with the
following sentence: “It was about midnight when Zarathustra started across the ridge of
the island so that he might reach the other coast by early morning.” Nietzsche provides a
prelude to the introduction of the eternal recurrence with Zarathustra’s speech:
I am a wanderer and a mountain climber, he said to his heart; I do not like the
plains, and it seems I cannot sit still for long. And whatever may yet come to me
as destiny and experience will include some wandering and mountain climbing: in
the end, one experiences only oneself. . . . What returns, what finally comes home
to me, is my own self and what of myself has long been in strange lands and
scattered among all things and accidents. And one further thing I know: I stand
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before my final peak now and before that which has been saved up for me the
longest. Alas, now I must face my hardest path! Alas, I have begun my loneliest
walk! But whoever is of my kind cannot escape such an hour—the hour which
says to him: ‘Only now are you going your way to greatness! Peak and abyss—
they are now joined together.’ 14
Nietzsche continues on in exploring the tension between height and depth; “It is out the
deepest depth that the highest must come to its height.”15 He writes of the hour
approaching, where “peak and abyss . . . are . . . joined together.” Nietzsche depicts such
a synthesis through a doubling of a doubling, or rather as Zarathustra deals with his
nemesis, the dwarf.
In a showdown between Zarathustra and the dwarf, coming upon on their path a
gateway, Zarathustra makes the following declaration:
‘Behold this gateway, dwarf!’ I continued. ‘It has two faces. Two paths meet
here; no one has yet followed either to its end. This long land stretches back for
an eternity. And the long lane out there that is another eternity. They contradict
each other, these paths; they offend each other face to face; and it is here at this
gateway that they come together.16
When Nietzsche writes about two movements, present to past, and future to present, he
does so in referring to a turning point, with significance added at the crux of his model of
time that transcends linear time as well as logical analysis. As Faust’s final speech
marked the significance of the opportunity to face death in terms set in time as a moment,
Nietzsche also marks the space I associate with the feminine divine in temporal terms:
“The name of the gateway is inscribed above: ‘Moment’.”
Nietzsche then goes on in referring to Zarathustra’s speech: “’Behold,’ I
continued, ‘this moment! From this gateway, Moment, a long, eternal lane leads
14
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backward: behind us lies an eternity.” Nietzsche then continues with his presentation of
the doctrine of the eternal recurrence:
Must not whatever can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever
can walk have walked on this lane before? Must not whatever can happen have
happened before? And if everything has been there before – what do you think . .
. of this moment? Must not this gateway too have been there before? And are not
all things knotted together so firmly that this moment draws after it all that is to
come? 17
Nietzsche describes his “entryway” into the doctrine of eternal recurrence in terms of a
gateway. It is crucial to note that the gateway to the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is
not the goal; it is only the entryway into something beyond the eternal recurrence. It is a
test of sorts, for human overcoming, to be able to face, not death or life, but the eternal
repetition of all that has been or is or will be. This “most abysmal thought” is the
gateway and the word “moment” hangs above it. It is the moment when the darkest hour
has arrived; but with the darkness comes the potential for overcoming. It comes through
accepting all of life, of willing even all the pain, chaos, and darkness, as well as all the
light and glory that has ever been, to recur eternally. Nietzsche then heralds the entryway
through the gate, not just in accepting, but also willing and loving all of existence. His
moment is associated with, if not facing death, then facing the transitory nature of
existence.
I describe Zarathustra’s approach to the “Realm of the Mothers” as necessary for
his eventual overcoming, an overcoming that could not take place were it not for aspects
of a feminine divine that includes the “realm of the mothers.” I argue that for Nietzsche,
such a descent associated with the “realm of the mothers” arises for him in his “most
17
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abysmal thought,” that is in the form of the eternal recurrence, as he first refers to it in
Part Three of Zarathustra. Nietzsche approaches the topic in the following manner:
Zarathustra is caught in his dualistic revelry, a theme continued throughout the text, of
Zarathustra split in two, speaking to his own heart, or to others as parts of himself,
including the dwarf, the spider, the “old women,” etc., in a manner which he eventually
overcomes. I suggest that his moment of overcoming is in fact directly related to his
ability to go “beyond good and evil.”18

Nietzsche writes of the dwarf with him, weighing him down, whispering things of
the most dismal nature into his ear. He then refers to a spider, as well as the light of the
moonlight in a manner that suggest them as representatives of his own soul’s
deliberations on life. In fact the moonlight itself has all the disparate fragments of his
being and self become as one in the soft whispering of their minds. Zarathustra says as
much: “And this slow spider, which crawls in the moonlight and this moonlight itself,
and I and you in the gateway, whispering together, whispering of eternal things— . . . .”
All these separate entities begin to coalesce in their thoughts and whispering concerning
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the eternal recurrence: “Must not all of us have been there before? And return and walk
in that other lane, out there, before us, in this long dreadful lane—must we not eternally
return?”19
Out of this prelude to overcoming, through the whispered revelry on the eternal
return, a dog interrupts the experience. This dog brings Zarathustra back in time to his
youth, when he remembered a dog “howl like this.” Nietzsche continues: “And I saw
him too, bristling, his head up, trembling, in the stillest midnight when even dogs believe
in ghosts—. . . .” Zarathustra appears to “wake up” as he then wonders: “Where was the
dwarf gone now? And the gateway” And the spider? And all the whispering? Was I
dreaming, then? Was I waking up?”20
Nietzsche plays within the twilight zone of perception in these passages, mixing
and confusing clear demarcations between dream and reality, and between reality and
dream. On my reading of this passage, there appears to be no dualism/division anymore
concerning perhaps the most human of all attributes of being human, that is of valuing
conscious thinking over dreams and visions.
Zarathustra then finds himself transported to a lonely mountaintop:
Among wild cliffs I stood suddenly alone, bleak, in the bleakest moonlight. But
there lay a man. And there---the dog, jumping, bristling, whining—now he saw
me coming; then he howled again, he cried.
Following Nietzsche’s ongoing leitmotif throughout his writings, that of transvaluation, it
is significant that it is not a god but an animal, a being from a “lower” realm of life, lesser
than human, that hearkens the moment of overcoming:
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Had I ever heard a dog cry like this for help? And verily, what I saw, --I had
never seen the like. A young shepherd I saw writhing, gagging, in spasms, his
face distorted, and a heavy black snake hung out of his mouth.
The most dreadful thing, a black snake hung out of the shepherd’s mouth. The imagery is
striking. As I interpret this passage, I see the snake as an icon for evil/Satan as well as
feminine wisdom, and correspondingly associated with Goethe’s “realm of the mothers.”
This snake may also aptly connote the Greek myth Medusa’s Head, an image I associate
with a feminist philosophy of religion in chapter four. The snake was stuck in the
shepherd’s mouth. In this moment certainly the natural impulse would be to spit out the
snake, to get rid of the most abysmal thought. It was a horrific moment: “Had I ever
seen so much nausea and pale dread on one face? He seemed to have been asleep when
the snake crawled into his throat, and there bit itself fast.” It was an abysmal, evil
stealthily crawling snake entering into the shepherd's mouth, awaking his complacent
sleep and arresting his soul.
Nietzsche first shows Zarathustra exhibiting his more human tendency to try to
relieve the distressed Sheppard of such nausea and dread: “My hand tore at the snake and
tore in vain; it did not tear the snake out of his throat.” Nietzsche then refers to
something not from beyond, but from within himself, crying out the command for
overcoming. The demand did not include a return to good and evil, trying to find a
weapon to kill the snake, as in a tit for a tat, for example. Instead the path toward
overcoming for Nietzsche moved in the opposite direction: “Then it cried out of me:
‘Bite! Bite its head off! Bite!’”
The way to overcoming is not through fighting against the other but in a thorough
integration of other and self, symbolized as a very body-centered “ingestion” of that
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which is evil, wicked, dark, deathly, dreadful, etc. The All becomes one. His path to
overcoming was not to “overcome evil,” it was to obliterate all notions of good and evil,
or other forms of dualistic approaches to thought and perception, altogether. Zarathustra
declares in his most transformative moment: “Thus it cried out of me—my dread, my
hatred, my nausea, my pity, all that is good and wicked in me cried out of me with a
single cry.”21 All that was fragmented, as through a looking glass darkly, became one. It
became whole in that moment for Zarathustra.
This is an oneness in terms of a transvaluation of Rosenzweig's cognition of the
All. Nietzsche may provide a demonstrative model of Rosenzweig’s transcendent One
related to mystical union with the divine. Nietzsche addresses those whom Rosenzweig
may describe as the philosophers seeking the cognition of the all, as those who love to
solve puzzles; they bring to clarity what is unknowable. Nietzsche is calling them,
evoking them, spurring them on toward overcoming.
He does so not by straightforward logical analysis or philosophical debate; he
instead poses a riddle:
You bold ones who surround me! You searchers, researchers, and whoever
among you has embarked with cunning sails on unexplored seas. You who are
glad of riddles! Guess me this riddle that I saw then, interpret me the vision of the
loneliest.22
He addresses the doctors of theology as well:
For it was a vision and a foreseeing. What did I see then in a parable? And who
is it who must yet come one day? Who is the shepherd into whose throat the
snake crawled thus? Who is the man into whose throat all that is heaviest and
blackest will crawl thus?23
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Who is the transvaluated redeemer, the one who didn’t follow his “Father’s will” in
tasting of the bitter cup, but instead was one who follows Zarathustra’s cry to “bite it”?
The shepherd becomes transformed, transfigured in fact, as he listened to Zarathustra’s
cry:
The shepherd . . . bit as my cry counseled him; he bit with a good bite. Far away
he spewed the head of the snake—and he jumped up. No longer shepherd, no
long human—one changed, radiant, laughing!24
Nietzsche describes the proto-type for becoming divine in a model of living
spontaneously and creatively. Nietzsche stands as a transvaluation of the heavy thinkers
weighed down by seriousness being lifted up in laughter. Nietzsche presents Zarathustra
as a redeemer that does not “Lord” himself over his sheep, giving service in passive
resignation, loving those he serves and limiting his potential by denigrating himself in the
service of the other. Christianity is not the path to overcoming for Nietzsche.
Nietzsche denigrates the Christian soul. This he does in contrast to his view on Christ
himself. Nietzsche wrote: “The word ‘Christianity’ is already a misunderstanding - in
reality there has been only one Christian, and he died on the Cross.”25
The “most abysmal thought,” I argue, resonates with Goethe’s references to the
Realm of the Mothers. This is a reference to a feminine with real power, majesty and
depth. It is one that stands in contrast to the banality of the eternal feminine current in
Nietzsche’s time. It is perhaps through what Nietzsche meant when referring to his
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“thoughts and the thoughts behind of my thoughts”26 that one may begin to understand
notions of the feminine divine that had relevance in his time as well as today. The
reference to thoughts “behind” thoughts implies a “return” both chronologically as well
as ontologically, or in other words it refers to both a prior in terms of history as well as a
prior in terms of human perception. This prior time suggests a return to the maternal
realm, to the earth as the womb, as well as a return to the origin of each and every
thought, feeling, or perception.
Nietzsche’s twosomeness, of being in solitude as well as community, mountain
tops/nature as well as the city, male as well as female, he integrates into a single
beginning before a beginning. It is a beginning akin to Rosenzweig's beginnings, arising
not from a transcendent above, but from the womb and ground from which all arise. It
reflects a beginning in a multidimensional sense, including time and being. This is a time
that is lost in seeking some essentialized eternal “truth” of/as “origin.” It is that quality
of seeking a final answer for, and explanation of, all of existence that Nietzsche depicts in
the heaviness leading Christian saints to become beasts of burden.
Zarathustra is not able to pry the snake out of shepherd’s mouth; he instead
remains torn between his countenance and heart, “willing” himself to give and to love.
The transfigured shepherd over-flows . . . with laughter. Upon my reading it functions in
terms feminist theorists Hélène Cixous will later refer to as the “Laugh of the Medusa.”27
It is an overflowing that provides Nietzsche with the spur toward overcoming:
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Never yet on earth has a human being laughed as he laughed! O my brothers, I
heard a laughter that was no human laughter; and now a thirst gnaws at me, a
longing that never grows still. My longing for this laughter gnaws at me; oh, how
do I bear to go on living! And how could I bear to die now!28
Nietzsche’s moment at the gateway toward overcoming embodies Rosenzweig’s
notion of a mystical union with the all. Nietzsche may not have approached such a union
through the parameters of the confines of faith in a Father God who encourages his sheep
to sleep rather than prodding them toward overcoming. Nietzsche was able to provide a
more radical reversal of previous thinking and faith. For again, in Zarathustra’s example
of one who moves beyond dualisms, beyond good and evil, he attains a “nondual”
experience. It is this very experience of non-duality that I extrapolate upon, and
distinguish as a characteristic of the feminine divine. I will be moving toward a more
thorough articulation of this experience as I later explore it as offering a unique vista with
which to view the world.
The time and place of nonduality presents itself as a new dimension, one the
western mind and psyche has to date not fully incorporated into its cultural awareness.
This seemingly new and enlightened avenue with which to view the world cannot be
considered as a something totally new, however: it instead adds a quality to human
perception that allows one to view more of what is already present. The nondual
experience in this way functions, as I will demonstrate, in and as the recognition of the
feminine divine. I suggest a recognition of it as the “source” of all life, and can help open
up an awareness of more of what it is to be human and also what is possible in “becoming
divine.” It is this notion of the feminine divine that I suggest Nietzsche initiates; he
28
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provides the clarion call for the higher men to be able to move closer to this gate or
avenue toward the feminine divine.
This non-dual perception resonates with Nietzsche’s notion of the third
metamorphosis. Rather than being stuck in the state of negation as Nietzsche’s lion,
willing only to say no to the past, he overcomes negation. Kierkegaard’s knight of
infinite resignation is perhaps not unrelated to Nietzsche’s camel stage of his second
metamorphosis. Going through the stage of negation in Nietzsche’s second
metamorphosis as a lion, akin to Rosenzweig’s suggestion to move from Nought to
nonNought, only then to enter Rosenzweig's gate, transitioning to Nietzsche’s third
metamorphosis as a child. This stage more resembles Kierkegaard’s knight of faith,
rather than a William James’s “will to believe.” Such a will to believe Nietzsche may
relegate to a deadening of life within the parameters of Christianity, following Paul, then
the Nicene Creed, where Christ as Übermensch becomes a Christian as “last man.”
Through theology, Christ’s moment of transfiguration turns into a dogmatic creed
developed not through life experience but in long and drawn out thought and debate.
Such a will to believe Nietzsche finds to be a detriment to his age, coming as it does from
a place of negation, the Nought, or infinite resignation. Nietzsche instead finds an
impetus and motivation for life coming not from restrained repression of passion but
instead from the Will to Power, as “the unexhausted procreative will of life.”29
Will to Power as the Feminine Divine
Nietzsche associates the will to power with his particular approach to redemption.
Nietzsche depicts redemption in ways similar to Rosenzweig, that is of focusing not on
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some essentialized notion of being, but rather on what Nietzsche described as the Will to
Power. Even as Rosenzweig views the source of redemption only in the Divine All,
Nietzsche, as I have shown, turns instead to a different type of divine, the feminine
divine. I associate the Will to Power with a feminine divine.
Alphonso Lingis describes Nietzsche’s will to power as life:
What do we mean when we say that life is Will to Power? What do we mean by a
powerful life? Just what are the powers of life? Let us take these questions not in
the sense of the metaphysical question “what is . . . ?,’ but rather the genealogical
question ‘who is. . ?’ Who, then, are powers? This properly Nietzschean
question leads us into the Nietzschean kind of genealogical interpretation of that
interpretation of all beings that is the Will to Power; this question aims not at a
metaphysical essence but at determining the quality of the Will to Power.30
Lingis addresses the question concerning the difference between Rosenzweig's All of the
philosophers and a Divine all. Lingis provides an analysis of how Nietzsche may address
the difference:
The ground [as the ‘original All’], then, the reason and the foundation for a
sequence of ever divergent appearances is unity. The self-identical that recurs.
Unity is the origin of being: the different is the derived. A thing, metaphysically
understood, is a unity that recurs across time, that reiterates itself across time and
space and, in doing so, generates a sequence of differing appearances of itself.31
Furthermore, Lingis expresses Nietzsche’s One, as
exist[ing] in repetition, reiterating itself, recurring. It is thus the source of the
world. The world is the show, the exhibition, of ever different and ever similar
beings generated by a ground, a force of unique Being.
Lingis very directly presents a potential difference between Rosenzweig’s and
Nietzsche's One. This difference shows how Nietzsche may have agreed with
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Rosenzweig, yet then gone beyond him. Lingis states as much, in referring to
Nietzsche’s critique of western religion, but also German idealism:
In the Christian epoch the One, source of the world, ground of all existence and of
all intelligibility, was equated with the God of Jewish monotheism. In the modern
epoch it is identified with the ego. The transcendental ego is the self-existence,
the pole of unity that recurs across time that identifies itself in all its experiences;
as such, it is the source and foundation, the ground, of the reality that unfolds
about it.
In this passage Lingis is able to explore more directly how Nietzsche’s Will to
Power is akin to the feminine divine: “. . . [To] affirm that the ground is Will to Power
means that the ground is not identity, the One, but original difference. We have in
Nietzsche a thought that is not persuaded by the immemorial metaphysical thesis that
similitude presupposes identity . . .” This is an origin of being as beginning that not only
herald’s God as dead, but functions within the environment of a lost father god. For it is
not any and every God that is dead, but the “God of monotheism, the monotheistic God.”
It is true that “the Gods have died.” Yet it is as Lingis points out: “They have died of
laughter upon hearing the Jewish god claim to be the sole god.”32
All the references to going under to go over appear to build Zarathustra’s
character in becoming a unique type of redeemer for an age with no “Father” God.
Zarathustra is not a redeemer in the manner in which Christians turned Christ the man
into a Savior, a redeemer, a Messiah. Zarathustra is a redeemer who can “face” the
notion of transience as a feminine divine of the “Realm of the Mothers,” not of “the
Eternal-Feminine.”
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In his section “On Redemption,” Nietzsche writes of the Will to Power in terms of
redemption. After Zarathustra speaks to the hunchback, “and to those whose mouthpiece
and advocate the hunchback was,” Zarathustra states:
Verily, my friends, I walk among men as among the fragments and limbs of men.
This is what is terrible for my eyes, that I find man in ruins and scattered as over a
battlefield or a butcher-field. And when my eyes flee from the now to the past,
they always find the same: fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents—but no
human beings.33
Zarathustra becomes the redeemer, but he is a redeemer that finds the strength for
overcoming not in a transcendent divine, but instead in the Will to Power with those
higher men who have the potential to follow Zarathustra in overcoming.
Nietzsche is placing the source of creativity and divinity within the human realm;
Zarathustra is one who is able to lead the way to Nietzsche’s particular promised land:
I walk among men as among the fragments of the future—that future which I
envisage. And this is all my creating and striving, that I create and carry together
into [the] One what is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident. And how could
I bear to be a man if man were not also a creator and guesser of riddles and
redeemer of accidents. 34
Zarathustra is one that heralds Nietzsche’s notion of amor fati: “to redeem those who
lived in the past and to recreate all ‘it was’ into a ‘thus I willed it’—that alone should I
call redemption.”35 Later in Part Three Nietzsche again has Zarathustra connect the
notion of amor fati with overcoming or becoming Übermensch:
I taught them all my creating and striving, to create and carry together into One
what in man is fragment and riddle and dreadful accident; as creator, guesser of
riddles, and redeemer of accidents, I taught them to work on the future and to
redeem with their creation all that has been. To redeem what is past in man and
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to re-create all ‘it was’ until the will says, ‘Thus I willed it! Thus I shall will it” -this I called redemption . . . . 36
This redemption involves descending to the depths I associate with the feminine divine.
Nietzsche had been thinking about his notion of the eternal recurrence from a
moment he refers to in his Ecce Homo:
The fundamental conception of this work, the idea of the eternal recurrence, this
highest formula of affirmation that is at all attainable, belongs in August 1881: It
was penned on a sheet with the notation underneath, ‘6000 feet beyond man and
time.’ That day I was walking through the woods along the lake of Silvaplana; at
a powerful pyramidal rock not far from Surlei I stopped. It was then that this idea
came to me.37
It may not be inconsequential that the particular shape of the rock had an impact on
Nietzsche. It was in the shape of a pyramid, which for Nietzsche most certainly would
have evoked ancient Egypt, a provocation I will allude to in chapter four regarding a
longing for a return to a primordial feminine associated with Egypt.
Nietzsche continues with a reference to Egypt when he describes “an omen a[s a]
sudden and profoundly decisive change in my taste.” This turning point Nietzsche
associates with Zarathustra and states it “may be reckoned as music; certainly a rebirth of
the art of hearing was among its preconditions.” Furthermore, he describes the
significance of this moment using imagery that connotes and evokes ancient Egypt:
In a small mountain spa not far from Vicenza, Recoaro, where I spent the spring
of 1881, I discovered together with my maestro and friend, Peter Gast, who was
also ‘reborn,’ that the phoenix of music flew past us with lighter and more
brilliant feathers than it had ever displayed before.
Nietzsche describes the moment of transformation or rebirth utilizing Egyptian
symbolism of the phoenix. The phoenix in ancient Egyptian culture is associated with
36
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death and resurrection, with becoming consumed by fire, and rising out of the ashes to be
reborn. This reference attains greater significance when noting that Nietzsche associates
the “moment” with becoming impregnated with and giving birth to what would become
Zarathustra eighteen months later:
But if I reckon forward from that day to the sudden birth that occurred in
February 1883 under the most improbable of circumstances . . . we get eighteen
months for the pregnancy. This figure of precisely eighteen months might
suggest, at least to a Buddhist, that I am really a female elephant.38
Just as Rosenzweig following him associates eastern philosophy with what I
identify as a type of feminine wisdom, Nietzsche here too makes a connection between
his experience of the creative process and a feminine divine. Accordingly so, if the path
to overcoming involves integrating all of life in terms that relate with a feminine divine, it
is significant that Nietzsche attributed ideas concerning the creative process in writing
Zarathustra to a woman.
In the Beginning . . . Was Andreas-Salomé’s “A Prayer to Life”
Nietzsche proclaims the notion of amor fati, the primary characteristic of the
Übermensch, that is to love all of life, even that which is painful, or rather to will even all
pain backwards to, as he describes it, a “something else [that] also belongs in this
interval: The “Hymn to Life.” This reference alludes to the poem “A Prayer to Life,”
written by Lou Andreas-Salomé. In noting this reference, a tantalizing possibility comes
to the fore, that is of noting as well Nietzsche’s association with Andreas-Salomé as it
appears to mirror some of his philosophical understandings.
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Nietzsche describes Andreas-Salomé’s poem “A Prayer to Life” as “attain[ing]
greatness.” He writes of what “may be reckoned as music”39 accompanying the words, as
they arise from his new-found rebirth of Zarathustra. Nietzsche writes of the poem:
“Whoever can find any meaning at all in the last words of the poem will guess why I
preferred and admired it . . . . Pain is not considered an objection to life: ‘If you have not
more happiness to give me, well then! you still have suffering’.”40
Nietzsche provides a transvaluation of western religion and thought, yet it is
Andreas-Salomé that composed the words to the poem/hymn. Her poem reads as Psalm
#88, the only psalm that does not end in finding a peaceful and loving resolution of life’s
difficulties in God. Psalm #88 reads:
But unto thee have I cried, O Lord; and in the morning shall my prayer prevent
thee
Lord, why castest thou off my soul? Why hidest thou they face from me?
I am afflicted and ready to die from my youth up: while I suffer thy terrors I am
distracted.
Thy fierce wrath goeth over me; thy terrors have cut me off.
They came round about me daily like water; they compassed me about together.
Lover and friend hast thou put far from me, and mine acquaintance into darkness.
Andreas-Salomé’s “Prayer to Life” also provides no hope or resolution of life’s
difficulties in God. The aim is not to praise, blame, or cajole God. Instead the “Hymn to
Life” focuses on a type of redemption based on accepting suffering/pain.
This is a pivotal moment for Nietzsche, as it captures his notion of amor fati. It
was at this moment that Nietzsche made an attempt for greatness in composing music to
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accompany Andreas-Salomé’s writing. The notion of accepting fate, all of fate, even
pain, he attributes to Andreas-Salomé:
Indeed, I love you life, as friend
Loves friend, in all your mystery—
Whether I wept or laughed again,
Whether you brought me joy or pain.
I love you even for the harm you do;
And if you must destroy me,
I’ll tear myself away from you
As I would leave a friend.
I embrace you with all my might!
Let your flames set me on fire,
And in the glow of that last fight
I will explore your riddle’s depths.
To be for centuries! to live!
Wrap your arms about me once again:
If you have no more joy to give—
At least you still grant pain.41
During this time Nietzsche writes of “a scarcely trivial symptom of my condition during
that year when the “Yes-saying” pathos par excellence which I call the tragic pathos, was
live in me to the highest degree.” Nietzsche praises this work as most movingly capturing
his being and thought. He declares in Ecce Homo: “The time will come when it will be
sung in my memory.” 42
Even though Nietzsche may have gotten the initial idea for the eternal recurrence
at an earlier moment in time, it was not until after he met Lou Andreas-Salomé that he
conceived of the connection between the eternal recurrence, amor fati, and the
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Übermensch. Given the context Nietzsche calls forth concerning his writing of
Zarathustra in Ecce Homo, that of pregnancy, re-birth, pro-creativity, life, and
redemption, one may do the math and find it compelling that it was roughly nine months
after Nietzsche and Andreas-Salome were together that Nietzsche was able to write Part
One of Zarathustra.43

I will later refer to Lou Andreas-Salome’s writings as she was influenced by as
well as influenced Nietzsche. Nietzsche had hopes that Andreas-Salomé would be his
disciple as Plato was to Socrates. She seemed in many ways unable to fulfill this role for
him. It is through a unique re-reading of Zarathustra, however, that includes some of
Andreas-Salomé’s thoughts on impermanence and her influence on Nietzsche's notion of
amor fati, that I suggest she was in fact a most loyal disciple. Or perhaps her role in his
life and writings, at least as far as Nietzsche was concerned, resembled the role that
Diotima plays in Plato’s Symposium: Arising from the realm of the mothers and offering
the highest teachings on love. But, in a reversal, it could also be the case that Nietzsche
was in many ways Andreas-Salomé’s disciple. What is for certain is that just as there
was confusion over whether Plato’s texts were the product of Socrates or Plato own
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thoughts, so too is there some confusion as to the source of some of Nietzsche’s key
concepts.
Furthermore, I will present an argument that in many ways Andreas-Salomé is
able to provide a sustainable critique of western philosophy and theology in a manner that
not only applied to her own age, but also provides insight into contemporary philosophy
and theology in providing a more systematic approach to a feminine divine for an age
that has lost their Father God. Not only does Andreas-Salomé delineate a most insightful
analysis concerning the history of philosophy and theology in her essay “Jesus the Jew,”
in her essay “The Consequences of the Fact That it Was Not Women Who Killed the
Father” she also explores aspects of the psyche concerning the lost mother, both in her
own writing, but also in regard to Nietzsche’s perspective on her. Andreas-Salomé’s
writings on the death drive and narcissism as well as another of her texts “The Erotic”
provides a bridge between Nietzsche and Rosenzweig and Freud and some French
feminist psychoanalytic theorists. Not only does Andreas-Salomé provide a bridge to
more contemporary approaches to Nietzsche and the feminine divine, but as I suggest in
chapter four, she helps in articulating a feminine divine that goes beyond contemporary
feminist philosophical and theological discourses.
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Chapter Four:
Remembering the Feminine Divine:
“Mother God is alive. Mother God remains alive. We will remember her.”
‘Where is my mother,’ he said. ‘I do not see her anywhere. I will go and look for her’, .
. . “I have a mother,’ said the baby bird. ‘ I will find her, I will I will . . .’
P. D. Eastman1
Mother is gone,
Only Things remain.
So be it

Denise Levertov2

Although the Grandmother has disappeared, the crinoline has nonetheless remained.
Siegfried Kracauer3
[The] substitution of “Mother God’ for ‘Father God,’ while leaving the concept of God
otherwise the same (‘God in a skirt’), it itself does not change very much.
Grace Jantzen4
In beginning to formulate a return of the feminine divine as is arises in
Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s text, and then more thoroughly in the works of some
French feminist psychoanalytic theorists, I return to inquire into the meaning of
becoming divine in the history of western theology and philosophy of religion. The
immediate question arises: What does it mean for a woman to “become divine”?
1
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Although Rosenzweig and Nietzsche may not have addressed the topic explicitly in their
writings, there is nonetheless a clear understanding in their texts that any approach to
apotheosis, including becoming divine as, but also through, a feminine divine, must come
about as embodied being. Rosenzweig and Nietzsche reiterate the need for a careful
consideration of how philosophical understandings impact individuals’ actual gendered
lives. They would not support the use of conceptual thinking, therefore, including a
potentially ultimate focus on apotheosis, in terms of genderless transcendent abstractions.
In addressing the question of “becoming” divine as it relates to Rosenzweig’s and
Nietzsche’s philosophical writings, it is significant to note the different definitions of the
word becoming. When used as an adjective, the word becoming describes an object as
being suitable, as giving a pleasing effect, or as being attractive in appearance. The
adjectival use of the word becoming is a matter of the divine coming to be beautiful, in
the sense of a becoming becoming. When a woman appears as a becoming divine, then
she manifests the appealing features which seem suitable for a divine being. However
one may also view her becoming divine as a verb, this would be a becoming that involves
the divination of the feminine, as a realization of a potentiality in a movement from a
lower level to a higher level of actuality. In relation to apotheosis, this latter approach is
arguably one proto-type for becoming divine that Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s writings
open the way for in the history of western philosophy.5 Rosenzweig and Nietzsche both

5

Kantian aesthetic theory may help elaborate the distinction between the two types of
becoming: the former type of female becoming divine is reminiscent of what Kant would
call the beautiful, alluding to her position as an object to be admired or desired; the latter
type of becoming divine is associated with the sublime, alluding to her position as a
speaking subject and arbiter of desire. Kant himself writes of the terms beautiful and
sublime in gendered terms with the female as being more akin to the beautiful and the
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view human insight and development in evolutionary terms. Their writings suggest a
means by which humans may grow in their abilities as human beings, perhaps, as I assert,
toward a type of redeemed life.
Furthermore, regarding the notion of apotheosis within the context of Jewish and
Christian religious traditions, one may also ask: How can humans be created in God’s
image, at least according to religious traditions that include the creation stories contained
with the Book of Genesis, and not be like him or her? If there is indeed a feminine
divine, then at least as far back as Platonic idealism in the history of western philosophy,
it follows that one’s earthly mother must be based on some supreme or ideal prototype of
heavenly motherhood. Yet, for the most part in mainstream Judaism and Christianity
there continues to be resistance to the notion not only of a feminine divine, but also of a
conception of an embodied god. There is a western, especially Platonic resistance against
the “body” in favor of the disembodied “soul.” The rejection of the feminine divine goes
hand in hand with the identification of the female with the body and “nature” which gives
the soul/spirit/mind the status of the supernatural, and thus dominance over nature and the
body. It follows that an erasure of a feminine divine in the history of Judaism and
Christianity coincides with the erasure of embodied divinity.6
As there was a forgetting of the feminine divine in the history of western theology
and philosophy of religion, attempts to recover her reflect the well-known account in

male having attributes more related to the sublime. See Kant, Observations on the
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Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle of the fort/da game. Freud describes the game as
one a male child (whom later scholars identified as his grandson Ernst) plays when his
mother is gone for a period of time. The game involves picking up an object and
throwing it out of sight and saying the word “fort,” the German word for forth or away.
The child then retrieves the lost toy and says “da,” the German word for there. Freud is
able to identify this game as bringing solace to the young child, who appears to
experience anxiety with the temporary loss of his mother. The child repeats the game
over and over.
This repetitive compulsive behavior functions as a form of melancholy; through a
longing to fill a void the child reacts to the loss of the mother in a manner that is beyond
his rational control rather than directly “facing” the absent mother. In his 1917 essay
“Mourning and Melancholy” Freud juxtaposes his notion of melancholy with that of
mourning, the former he describes as pathological and the latter as normal. If little Ernst
were to face the loss/emptiness directly, realizing that his mother is in fact gone, he may
in a sense mourn her loss it in order to heed the “call of reality” to let go of the beloved
lost object, thus liberating libidinal desire to be able to love an other. He would then
fully heal from the loss/trauma, and as a consequence refrain from further compulsive
and repetitive behavior.
In contrast to mourning, Freud distinguishes melancholy as involving an inability to
consciously acknowledge the loss. What happens in the case of the melancholic is that
what was lost becomes deposited in the unconscious; a melancholic would then react
with resistance, or even with violence toward that which threatens the ego. Freud’s
writings on loss, particularly during World War I, the period of time he was writing
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“Mourning and Melancholy,” offer a means by which to evaluate theological and societal
approaches to the loss of a mother God and the subsequent consequences of this loss in
the realm of religion in general.
Fort! Are You My Mother?
In her book Becoming Divine: Toward a Feminist Philosophy of Religion Feminist
philosopher Grace Jantzen notes how throughout the history of western philosophy of
religion and theology, God is male. Following Irigaray’s generative text “Divine
Woman,” Jantzen points out that when women in western religious traditions seek to
“become divine” they have no maternal model to emulate. Western religious thought has
helped form as well as continues to influence the Western psyche and culture.
Throughout the history of Western theology and philosophy there has not been a Mother
God for women to identify with and/or emulate, nor for a man to accept and integrate into
his sense of divinity/perfection. There is no image or iconic representation of the divine
mother, nor--as I will explore below--is there a recognition of the maternal presence as it
is associated with the most “primal” experience in human life when the child has no
sense of separation from the mother in the early months of infancy. As I demonstrate, the
two are related.
According to a psychoanalytic perspective, the time in the early development of a
child’s growing sense of self-hood involves a quasi-mystical state; there are no clear
boundaries demarcating self from other. Where everything is considered one in unity
with the whole, there exists nothing whatsoever to say, think, or do. It is a time of
fullness. Within the context of the “Western” mind, however, this time may be equated
not with a fullness or plenitude, but instead with of a loss of self-hood or death. It is as
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Rosenzweig’s dual notion of the All, one referring to the All of a mystical experience and
the other referring to the All as sense of emptiness or nihilism. Death in this sense has
been associated with the mother or the maternal realm. As I have shown, through an
opening in my reading of Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s texts, there comes forth an
unveiling of what is associated with the maternal: death, birth, nature, pre-history, etc.
This something “other” I establish as the gateway through which to enter a feminine
divine.
Rosenzweig ascribes the philosophical striving to know “the essence” to the
ongoing endeavour to avoid facing death. Both Rosenzweig and Nietzsche draw out the
feminine in terms of facing death in order not only to understand but, more importantly,
to live life to the full. Avoiding looking backward to one’s origin becomes a form of
suicide for both figures in their respective approaches to life, philosophy, and the
feminine. Both Rosenzweig and Nietzsche assert, at least when read as I am attempting
to read them here in this dissertation, that fullness of living can only be found by turning
back toward what normally can not be faced directly, or rather that which one cannot face
directly, and live, at least insofar as one has understood life up till then--that is, face death
as it is associated with the feminine divine as the material realm.
I will explore an opening through my reading of Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s
texts, alluding to some of the cultural influences of their time, as an uncovering of an
experience of the feminine divine. First I will use psychoanalytic theory to trace the
cultural historical context in which to place their entryway into the history of philosophy.
I do so in order to help support the truly revolutionary and potentially powerful force of
their philosophical understandings. Using a psychoanalytic perspective to explore more
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fully how philosophical as well as psychoanalytical understandings evolved from the
mid-19th to the early 20th century in Europe will set the stage to profit from Rosenzweig’s
and Nietzsche’s legacy in bringing to light a rejuvenated feminist philosophy of religion.
The result will be an approach to a feminist philosophy of religion that is not
created ex nihilo, but is reformulated through mining the past for insights to recreate a
philosophy for the present and future. In such an approach, the feminist philosophy of
religion would no longer try to move forward based on what has presumably been lost in
the western psyche, but instead would function to uncover and realize the true origin of
being from that which, it turns out, we never really left: the maternal realm as the
feminine divine.
In order to explore a “lack” of the feminine divine, in either representations, or
even acknowledgements, of a Mother God in western theology, philosophy of religion,
and culture, initially Lou Andreas-Salome, then subsequently French psychoanalyst
scholars such as Kristeva, Cixous, and Irigaray, offer insights indicating that Western
religion arises not from the Oedipal Complex or death of the father, as in classic Freudian
theory, but from the loss of the mother, or, rather, from never really dealing with the fear
of such loss.
Diane Jonte-Pace argues for a counter-thesis to Freud’s “master thesis,” which is
cast in terms, as Jonte-Pace puts it, of an “Oedipal paradigm, characterized by death
wishes for fathers and by erotic desires for mothers.”7 Instead of associating death with
the father, Jonte-Pace suggests a counter-thesis: “. . . God, mothers, mortality, and
7
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immortality appear as interlocking topics, which Freud was unable to confine within a
narrative of father-murder and mother-love. Often interruptive and subversive, this
counter-thesis haunts Freud’s psychology of religion, as if to challenge the dominance of
the Oedipal paradigm.”8
Certain of Jonte-Pace’s directives not only help illuminate Freud’s writings, but
are also suggestive of making a slight but significant variation of a famous feminist
dictum: changing the slogan that “the personal is political” into “the personal is
cultural.” Not only does Freud’s viewpoint reflect his personal biography, but it is also a
product, as well as a producer, of Western culture. With that in mind, we can return to
Freud’s last and perhaps most perplexing text, Moses and Monotheism, in order to
provide a fresh reading of some core issues of that text by viewing it through the lens of
Jonte-Pace’s “counter thesis.” Doing so will allow us to explore some hidden territory,
providing insight into how a strictly Freudian psychoanalysis might not only obscure, but
might also be used to help bring insight, into the loss of the mother in western theology
and philosophy of religion.
Again, one thing reading Moses and Monotheism through what Diane Jonte-Pace
identifies as her counter-thesis associating death with the mother, correcting what she
identifies as Freud’s “master thesis” associating death with the father, does is to open a
view on Freud’s work and thinking as a man representative of his time and culture. In
what follows, I offer a commentary on Freud’s Moses and Monotheism to support my
argument that he functions as representative of Western thinking during his own time as
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well as today in not being able to face and accept the loss of the divine mother in the
history of Judaism, and likewise in the history of western thought/life in general.
In Moses and Monotheism Freud advances two crucial claims he views as
controversial: 1) Moses was an Egyptian; 2) Moses was killed by his followers. Freud
found through his reading of the scriptural texts at issue that there were parapraxis or
signs/symptoms of a pathology or trauma evident in the Hebrew Bible, a trauma which he
argues is that of a murder. He interprets such textual parapraxis and other forms of
textual deviance and divergence as follows: “The distortion of a text is not unlike a
murder. The difficulty lies not in the execution of the deed but in the doing away with
the traces.”9 Additionally Freud indicated “two distinct forces, diametrically opposed to
each other” that “have left their traces on [the text], falsifying the text in accord with
secret tendencies, maiming and extending it until it was turned into its opposite.” He
speaks of one force extending to the place of the other, functioning as “an indulgent piety
reign[ing] over it, anxious to keep everything as it stood, indifferent to whether the details
fitted together or nullified one another.” He then describes evidence of the conflicting
forces in the Biblical text itself: “. . . Almost everywhere there can be found striking
omissions, disturbing repetition, palpable contradictions, signs of things the
communication of which was never intended.”
Freud’s chosen narrative to provide context for the trauma was the murder of the
father, he reasons from the Oedipal paradigm based on “totemic religion” where brothers
gathered to kill their father. According to that underlying claim, one can easily see the
logic and derivation of the second point above, that Moses’ followers killed him.
9
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However, the first point, that Moses was an Egyptian, does not seem to follow as clearly.
Why would Moses as “father” of the Jews not really be a Jew at all, but an Egyptian
instead, a member of a people contemporary Egyptologist Jan Assmann describes as
playing, in the Western historical imagination, the role of the “rejected, discarded, and
abandoned.”10 In other words, why would Freud associate Moses with the pre-historical
maternal realm? Clearly, Egypt, in its role as the cradle of civilization, represents prehistory, or the pre-oedipal realm for Freud. This accords with the idea of Egypt
functioning, as Assmann points out using Julia Kristeva’s terminology, as an “abject”
civilization.
Even though the real loss/murder was not of the father God, but of the feminine
divine or mother God, Freud did not acknowledge this. Instead his only recourse to
explain the troubling narrative lacunae he has identified as symptomatic of trauma was,
again, to fall back into his seeming obsession with the Oedipal complex. He explores the
point in his earlier Totem and Taboo where Freud argues that in primitive societies, the
brothers/sons rise up to kill the father. Freud thereby surmises a convoluted plot that
culminates in the murder of Moses, the father, by his followers, the sons. With regard to
the question of how Freud came up with such a convoluted narrative plot to explain away
the pathological anomalies in the text that he takes to be indicative of trauma, and/or to
be signs of guilt manifest in textual evidence of masking or attempting to cover over a
crime, I would suggest it may be Freud’s own account that functions to reinforce the
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Biblical text in covering over a very different “crime.” This is a crime in which the true
murder being masked is the murder, not of the father, but of the divine mother.
Although it is well established that Freud had extensive correspondence with Lou
Andreas-Salomé, there seems to be no explicit recognition on his part, at least to the
extent that it comes up in his later writing, of some of her interpretive analysis concerning
the topic. In relation to the loss of a past “matriarchy,” Peter Davis refers to AndreasSalomé as in fact recognizing an alternative reading to Freud’s approach. In regard to
Freud’s approach to taboo, Andreas-Salomé writes the following, as Davis notes:
With regard to the short essay ‘The Taboo of Virginity’ it occurred to me that this
taboo may have been intensified by the fact that at one time (in a matriarchal
society) the woman may have been the dominant partner. In this way, like the
defeated deities, she acquired demonic properties, and was feared as an agent of
retribution. Also her defloration by deity, priests, etc. points back to a time when
she was not ‘private property’ of the male, and in order to achieve this she had to
shake off the shackles of her impressive past – which may still play its part as the
earliest positive basis for the precautionary measure against the male.
Davies draws this conclusion:
Rather than the Darwinian primal horde with its dominant father murdered and
devoured by his sons, Andreas-Salomé suggests that a matriarchal cultural phase
has a significant influence on psychological phenomena, rather than simply being
an incidental phase of transition.11
With this idea in mind, it is worth noting that until his own death Freud continued
to be haunted and perplexed by Moses and Monotheism. Just as he found evidence of a
trauma--a murder--in the lacunae of the Biblical text, so too is there a general consensus
in the secondary literature that Moses and Monotheism itself also contained distortions.
Thus, as one scholar puts it, “The text of Moses and Monotheism seems to reflect the
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difficulties Freud experienced while composing it. It is riddled with apologies,
hesitations, repetitions.”12
Interestingly, just as Freud appears to have struggled in composing his own text, so
too do some authors of commentary on that Freudian text likewise express experiencing a
type of troubling haunting concerning the topic addressed in that text. For example,
Richard J. Bernstein notes that he shared with Jan Assmann an experience of angst in
composting his own writings on Moses and Monotheism: “Assmann tells us that once he
started writing his book, he could not set it aside to work on other projects until he had
completed his final draft. He speaks of the Moses discourse as having a life of its own.”
Bernstein concludes: “I too have experienced this compelling power.”13
Freud’s notion of “the uncanny” can be applied to such a troubling haunting of
angst. In utilizing a type of counter thesis to Freud’s own master thesis in reading Moses
and Monotheism, one can argue that writing on such topics would be certain to evoke a
sense of the uncanny as occurs when what should have been covered over or repressed
somehow becomes manifest despite all the efforts to hide it. Along those very lines,
Freud himself refers to “Schiller’s definition of the uncanny as something which ought to
have remained hidden, but has come to light.”14
Freud’s two-page psychoanalytical critique of the Greek myth “Medusa’s Head”
further reflects as well as helps shape the assumed masculinist approach to the mother in
relation to the uncanny. Due to the castration complex, one (who is male) is simply not
12
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able to look directly, or to “face” the lack (of a phallus, or the cultural representation of a
masculinist culture). Freud’s discusses the uncanny in a manner that relates to Medusa’s
Head: “There is something uncanny about the female genital organs. This unheimlich
place, however, is the entrance to the former Heim [home] of all human beings, to the
place where each one of us lived once upon a time and in the beginning. . . . In this case,
. . . the unheimlich is what was once heimlich, familiar; the prefix ‘un’ is the token of
repression.”15
Freud indicates there is within the western andocentric culture he was a part of a
most deeply imbedded terror of looking at the female body. The terror arises because of
the castration anxiety, yet another fear stems from the lack representing the loss of the
mother in western psyche and culture. Freud himself appeared not able to face this loss
directly and again in many ways his brilliance as a thinker, “scientist,” and certainly
writer was in his ability to write texts that appear to function as mythopoetic. This type
of text, which includes his commentary on Medusa’s Head, functions as a speculum or
mirror one may use in providing indirect exposure to a truth too traumatic to face
directly. The text as speculum/mirror veils a truth too devastating to face while at the
same time it provides access to it. It is through a speculum, through interpretation, that
one may come to face a truth not accessible to the ordinary eye. The imagery here helps
to substantiate using psychoanalytic theory in order to come to face a feminine divine.
Expanding further the reading of Moses and Monotheism through the lens of Jonte-Pace’s
counter-thesis also brings to light some aspects of the western perspective on the
beginnings of Monotheism. The Hebrew Tradition brought with it the notion of
15
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monotheism: one male Father God. Through what, following Assmann, we may identify
as ‘normative inversion,’ when that which comes before is “rejected, discarded, and
abandoned,” there appears to be a disparaging of Egyptian culture in play here. The
process of normative inversion indicates that when something comes into being, it must
necessarily wipe out what came before.
According to this paradigm then, Freud would assumably regard Egypt as inferior,
precisely because of its association with the maternal realm. Yet, he exhibits a type of
crossover structure through his claim that Moses was not Jewish, but Egyptian. By
Freud’s reconstruction, Moses was not of lowly birth, and only adopted into Egyptian
royalty, who subsequently returns to his own people to lead them out of their slavery.
Rather, he was actually born into the “higher caste,” someone highborn who later chose
to turn around and lead a lowly people. Thus, Freud, writing in the first half of the
twentieth century in Europe, offers an additional flip to those already to be found on the
surface of the scriptural text: Moses was not of Jewish birth, one of the “chosen people”
who reigns over what had come before, taken as being the pre-verbal/pre-oedipal depths
of human existence, but was, instead, born an Egyptian and, as such, risen from the
maternal realm become abject. He was one of the abject who rises above and comes
eventually to turn around and chose to lead the supposed civilized European Jewry into
freedom.
Freud’s own “unconscious” haunting by such an anomalous narrative may be
indicative of something with potentially far greater significance than his own individual
psychic history. It would then be just this significance that plagued Freud and others
regarding the topic. It isn’t until and through Lou Andreas-Salomé writing as an early
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feminist psychoanalytic theorist and then some French feminist analysts following her
that there arises the possibility of a full transvaluation in cross-over structure of
human/divine relations. As I will outline later in the chapter, it is through such a reversal
that we may begin to articulate a transvaluation of the Father God as being primary.
DA! Finding the Lost Feminine
Another of Freud’s texts that helps to illuminate some aspects of what I am arguing
for viewing as the repression of a feminine divine presence is Civilization and Its
Discontents. In it Freud refers to a letter by Romain Rolland describing what Rolland
identified as the “true source of religious sentiments,” the “oceanic feeling,” that is, a
“feeling as of something limitless, unbounded—as it were, ‘oceanic.” Freud identified the
oceanic feeling with an earlier phase of ego development when “an infant at the breast
does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations
flowing in upon him.”16 During this time in a child’s development there is no sense of
separation of the ego from the world around. As Freud puts it: “. . . Originally the ego
includes everything, later it separates off an external world from itself. Our present egofeeling is, therefore, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive--indeed, an allembracing—feeling which corresponded to a more intimate bond between the ego and
the world about it.”17
Even though Freud--and later Lacan--reasons that earlier phases of ego
development may continue to be present in later stages of development, he does not seem
able to allow for the “oceanic feeling” to be a true impetus for religious feeling. Here
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again, he turns to his master-thesis in identifying the human tendency to be religious as
relating only to a need for God the father and for his protection. Even as Freud was able
to assign the “oceanic feeling,” which he admits may exist in many people, to what can
be traced back to an early phase of ego-feeling, he is still unable to associate this oceanic
feeling, correlated as it is with the mother, with “true” religious sentiment.
Thus, in trying to fit all experience, including, it appears, some aspect of the
oceanic feeling clearly related to the infant’s time with her mother, into his master thesis,
Freud writes: “The derivation of religious needs from the infant’s helplessness and the
longing for the father aroused by it seems to me incontrovertible, especially since the
feeling is not simply prolonged from childhood days, but is permanently sustained by fear
of the superior power of Fate.” Here Freud seems to connect an infant’s oceanic state in
terms not of bliss, plentitude, or enjoyable feelings, but instead as the “need” for, as well
as fear of, the father: “I cannot think of any need in childhood as strong as the need for a
father’s protection.” He then concludes: “Thus the part played by the oceanic feeling,
which might seek something like the restoration of limitless narcissism, is ousted from a
place in the foreground.”
Earlier in the text Freud makes it clear in relation to his comparison of the human
ego development with the evolution of the city Rome, that “the same space cannot have
two different contents.”18 Nevertheless, even as Freud is attempting to indicate, in the
form of a recapitulation, how an earlier phase in the history of western Jewry was not
lost, but always remained as a residue or as traces like those left on a “mystic writing
pad,” he does not appear able to note an obvious contradiction: Judaism could not inhabit
18
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the same space as the earlier, pictorial, pre-historical Egyptian culture. Here too he
exhibits an inability to face the loss: Still present in what was “lost” are traces or residue
of the Mother or maternal realm in terms associated with God. He indicates as much
when he suggests his thought processes have led him down a blind alley: “The origin of
the religious attitude can be traced back in clear outlines as far as the feeling of infantile
helplessness. There may be something further behind that, but for the present it is
wrapped in obscurity.”19 If there ever were a gap in a text, a lacunae indicating there is
something missing, it may be in his words “wrapped in obscurity”; here he demonstrates
his inability to explore the oceanic feeling as a time/space of significance in relation to
the mother, particularly as divine creator.20
In being representative of his age as well as western culture in general, there is thus
manifest in Freud’s own writing a lacuna concerning the maternal realm. The
repercussions of thus missing such a crucial aspect of the human psyche, perhaps
especially as it concerns a philosophy of religion for the west, calls for a more fleshed out
approach to a feminist philosophy of religion. This would be a feminine philosophy of
religion that involves a feminine divine not as a “mother substitute” serving to placate the
true traumatic murder. Instead it demonstrates the value in seeking a “beginning” of
human existence both individually and as a people, in returning to Rosenzweig’s and
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Nietzsche’s writings as they open the path toward a more integrated approach to divinity,
in western religion and life.
Rather than facing the loss, as Rosenzweig and Nietzsche assert to be necessary,
what Freud calls the death drive would compel a repetition of the loss/trauma with the
accompanying attempt to fill in what was lost: a sense of wholeness. As noted in Freud’s
reference to little Ernst’s game of fort/da, or as Lacan’s notion of the objet petit a, it
works as just another attempt to turn outward and try to fill the gap with another object.
Certain attempts to retrieve the lost Goddess are facile; they are not helpful in any way
other than to provide a temporary fix. They function to support the status quo of
patriarchal religion and society in that they focus on conceptual knowledge and language
in the spirit of Rosenzweig’s All of the philosopher, rather than of a sense of
vastness/emptiness or infinite potentiality. It would be an example of a becoming divine
rather than one of becoming divine.
Many if not most attempts to “retrieve” the lost feminine divine or mother in
western religion and culture have remained at such a level of the mother substitute, rather
than allowing for the western psyche to face the loss, the lack of the feminine divine in
western theology and culture. In facing the Real in Lacanian terms, I argue one may face
what can be called the divine mother. The process is not so much a return or recovery, a
remembering, but an acknowledgement of the emptiness at the origin of being; this is an
origin of being that leads not to nothingness, but to absolute plentitude. This point aligns
with the particular nature of the feminine divine uncovered in the cross-reading of
Rosenzweig against Nietzsche, and so contextualized it has the potential to supply a
unique perspective on a feminine divine in relation to the modern western psyche.
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Reiterating Freudian psychoanalytic theory to help demonstrate the point: any
attempt to come up with a conception of an one-dimensional Goddess would function as
a “mother-substitute” in a manner that reflects not what Freud refers to as mourning, but,
instead, melancholy. It would therefore only help further a type of melancholic repetition
compulsion in the west, that of not facing the loss of the feminine divine to truly mourn
and heal, but instead functioning to try to placate the loss though some imaginary figure.
Such a form of worship of the feminine divine would not allow for a true realization of
what has been lost/forgotten, but instead further support the status-quo. Coming up with
an iconic representation of the feminine divine without first facing her loss in western
theology would add to a continuation of a patriarchal and potentially oppressive approach
to religious worship. It would be little more than the return of the Goddess as “God in a
skirt.”21 In effect, then, it is really the loss -- the unacknowledged, un-mourned loss -- of
the mother that expresses itself in the Freudian myth of the murder/death of the Father.
In my estimation there can be two ways the Feminine divine may come to the fore in
western theological traditions: 1) as a mother substitute, or objet a function, as in the
fort/da game where there is an attempt to conceptualize a mother figure to replace the
gaping loss/lack with some replica of the original maternal force, or as Jantzen would
describe it, “God in a skirt”; 2) as what Helene Cixous might refer to as a laughing
Medusa, or Luce Irigaray would define as a woman becoming divine as she may arise to
divinity in her own right. In the first of these approaches we find many attempts to
21
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reclaim, or remember the lost mother in western culture by turning to pre-historical,
“Goddess culture.”22 The second turns to explore what Freud was not able to do in his
writings, but that, I am arguing, Rosenzweig and Nietzsche read through one another, as I
am attempting to do, make possible.
I will shortly make use Julia Kristeva’s reference to the semiotic chora to provide a
bridge of sorts between western psychoanalytical as well as metaphysical perspectives.
In addition, Luce Irigaray’s recent text Between East and West: From Singularity to
Community shows a turn to eastern thought. In it she utilizes eastern perspectives and
traditions not just to study, but as a practice, in a manner that may enable women in
general not just to study about the feminine divine, but also, following Rosenzweig’s and
Nietzsche’s approaches to philosophy as life, to become it.
In reference to the first manner of return of the mother in western theology and
philosophy of religion, I have suggested efforts to replace the lost mother do little more
than cover over the true loss of the feminine divine with a decoy of the security of a
comfortable mother substitute. It would be another attempt at mastery, as Anne-Claire
Mulder makes clear in her description of Freud’s “fort/da” game as “motivated by the
‘Bemächtigungstrieb,’ the instinct or drive to master: the drive to master a situation; in
this case the drive to master (the presence and absence of) [Ernst’s] mother.”23
Significantly, rather than deal with the profundity of the original loss, these traditions
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instead use beautiful and loving images of an all-good, benign and accepting mother as a
substitute object for not facing the true loss/trauma of the originary mother object.
In order to construct a philosophy of religion that functions as the second approach
defined above, as a form of mourning versus melancholy, I will return to Rosenzweig’s
emphasis on emptiness. As I’ve noted earlier, in Part I of the Star Rosenzweig describes
the Chinese idea of the Tao in terms of “nothingness as the origin of something”: “The
Tao is this: effecting without acting; it is a god who keeps ‘quite as a mouse’ so that the
world can move around him.” Again, Rosenzweig continues:
It is entirely without essence; nothing exists in it in the way that every self, for
example ‘exists’ in the Brahma. Rather it itself exists in everything . . . to use the
analogy of the Upanishads, in the way the salt crystals exist in a solution [,] . . . in
the way that the hub exists in the spokes, as the window exists in the wall, or the
empty space in a vessel. It is that which, by being ‘nothing,’ makes a something
useful, the unmoved mover of the movable. It is the non-act as the basis of act.”24
In certain respects this notion of emptiness that Rosenzweig associates with eastern
religious traditions and texts reflects the early states of childhood development associated
with Freud’s “oceanic feeling,” the maternal realm, or the semiotic chora, as nothing, but
at the same time as everything. Even the early stages of childhood development
associated with Freud’s oceanic feeling and Plato’s chora are fundamental in the
development of self. Kristeva, however, correctly identifies the western tradition as
associating anything related to the pre-linguistic maternal realm as necessarily evoking a
sense of the abject. Anything associated with the “mother” must, accordingly, be cut off
or otherwise gotten rid of in the formation both of an individual psyche/subject and, at a
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cultural level, in the formation of society. Rather than treating the pre-ego maternal
realm as the originary state of being, Western culture, as I have explored through an
evaluation of some of Freud’s writings, seems not only to have degraded this primordial
time and space to the status of the abject, but also to have erased it, to have lost or
forgotten it altogether. What we have thereby lost in western civilization is a presence of
the mother, including, in western theology, the divine mother.
From a masculinist perspective, what was thus erased and cut off must also not be
allowed any voice or power that might reverse, or even acknowledge and bewail, the
erasure and amputation. Hence when the female speaks, as subject, she produces a
feeling of Freud’s uncanny, that odd feeling of dis-ease that comes over one when, as
Freud noted in a famous passage from his piece on the “Uncanny,” something one thinks
is dead speaks, when “something repressed . . . recurs.”25 Inherent in this perspective is
the notion that we have lost, in Western civilization, a sense of the beginning before the
‘Beginning,’ a pre-beginning associated with the maternal realm--what, in Lacan’s
formulation, is before or beyond the Phallus, taken as the structuring principle of the
symbolic order or language.
My earlier reference to the Greek myth “Medusa’s Head” can now be used to
address some aspect of the inability to face the “feminine” as loss in western culture.
Again, in his analysis of the Greek myth, Freud notes the difficulty in looking at
Medusa’s Head face-to-face.26 Due to what Freud identifies as the castration complex, he
theorizes that one cannot face the lack in the image of Medusa, the threat of the loss of
25
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male power/divinity represented as the phallus. According to Freud, therefore, there is
something terrifying about facing the lack.27
Freud clearly articulated such archetypal imagery in the Greek myth in terms that
evoked horror. Hélène Cixous plays on Freud’s influential short reflection on the Greek
myth of Medusa. In her “Laugh of the Medusa,” Cixous does not simply describe
another mother substitute to fill in for the silenced voice; instead when her Medusa
laughs, she overflows with a type of feminist articulation of “woman as speaking subject”
as écriture féminine, as jouissance.28 There arises the need for a feminist theology as
embodying a laughing medusa in making a positive and transformative movement into
the future, one that truly breaks free of the “status-quo” and points in the direction of not
just approaching the pathway toward divinity, but actually entering into the kingdom.
Certainly notions of the feminine divine related to the maternal realm of the chora,
in addition to Kristeva’s notions of semiotics, join well with Cixous's “Laugh of the
Medusa” in articulating a way of reclaiming the lost feminine, but a way that functions
not through the introduction of some mother substitute, like the doll/toy in the “fort/da”
game in Freud. Instead, it represents a chance to mourn the loss of the mother, and
provides an opportunity for healing from the loss. Here arises an aspect of a human
27
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search for divinity that is not reduced to a nostalgia for a lost feminine/feminist utopia.
Instead it involves an opportunity for women to find empowerment and autonomy. In the
spirit of the model Irigaray sets forth in her idea of women “becoming divine,” women
realize their inherent worth and dignity.
In order to seek a better understanding, or perhaps the “essential” nature of the
feminine divine in the manner Freud was seeking the “essential” nature of being Jewish
in his Moses and Monotheism, Kristeva turns to a text from the western canon, namely,
Plato’s Timaeus. In her analysis of that text, Kristeva is able to draw out “earlier stages
in ego development” of the western psyche, and not allow the masculinist master-thesis
of the Oedipal paradigm to oust it “from a place in the foreground.” Kristeva identifies
the early states of childhood development associated with the material realm, the Platonic
chora, as fundamental in the development of self. She then begins to articulate the Real
accordingly, providing a reference from western philosophy to the feminine divine in
Plato’s chora. I associate the chora with a “space” out of which everything arises. It is as
such the foundation or “rock” of being. It is also, as Plato noted, and as Freud also
asserted, wrapped in obscurity.
The closest Freud comes to openly and directly discussing the obscure time before
the ego develops, or the womb-like origin of existence, is through his notion of the
uncanny. In elaborating on the uncanny he associated with female genitalia, or Medusa’s
Head, Freud quite eloquently and openly describes the manner by which something that
at one time was quite familiar, or heimlich, becomes strange, or unheimlich. He describes
the discomforting tension that arises when what was once quite familiar becomes
“othered” through a process of repression. Even as such, rather than leaving it in
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obscurity as Freud did during the time he wrote Civilizations and its Discontents, or
addressing it in a more analytical fashion as he did on his commentary on Medusa’s head,
Kristeva turns to face it.
Referring to Plato’s Timaeus, Kristeva utilizes Plato’s treatment of the chora in
describing it as a receptacle of becoming. There is a notion here of space, not viewed as
empty in any negative sense, but instead as teeming with wild energy. The chora, as
Plato developed, and as Kristeva further expands upon, thus proves useful in articulating
the return of the divine mother as laughing medusa, rather than as a mere mother
substitute.
Freud’s penchant for viewing psychoanalytic theory as a science in fact can be
read as a symptom of his inability to delve into the realm of what Kristeva would
associate with the maternal realm. That realm, like the semiotic, is not associated with
written language, but with poetic/image-laden language. Furthermore, Kristeva’s notions
of the symbolic and the semiotic may be particularly significant for interpreting Freud’s
reference to Egyptian “pictorial” writing as being more primitive than alphabetical
writing.
Freud refers to the possibility that the Hebrew scribes were the first to create a
written alphabet. According to a type of Freudian recapitulation, the early scribes
functioned as the name of the father or law of the father, initiating language in written
form in order to provide entryway into the realm of the symbolic. Freud refers to the
suggestion “that early Israelites, the scribes of Moses, had a hand in the invention of the
first alphabet,” he then comments: “If [the Hebrew scribes] were bound by the
prohibition against making images they had even a motive for forsaking the hieroglyphic
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picture writing when they adapted their written signs for the expression of a new
language.”29 Freud’s commentary supports an argument for the scientifically
questionable notion of recapitulation, assigning historical time periods to the stages in the
development of an individual psyche. In such a comparison, the Egyptians would be
associated with the material realm. Their means of communication would thereby
necessarily involve a less sophisticated pictorial-laden language. This is a language
Kristeva redeems, however, from the realm of the abject in her semiotic she associates
with the maternal realm.
Maria Margaroni indicates that for Kristeva, the chora’s function “is to displace the
speaking subject, retracing its emergence not only ‘before’ logos but also, in returning it
to the maternal body, beyond the Phallus as the structuring principle of the symbolic
order.”30 In considering such a move, one may critique Kristeva’s use of the chora,
interpreting it as just another attempt to find a replacement for the lost mother.
Margaroni counters that argument by first acknowledging that for Kristeva the chora may
offer some “utopian promise . . . [as] an escape from logos, culture, and history,”31 but
still the promise does not identify an object to serve as any mother substitute. Rather,
Margaroni argues, “it resists any theoretical reification – even as a fugitive pre-originary
origin. The chora is in fact as Freud asserts, the oceanic felling; it is not something to
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recover or remember; it cannot, therefore be reduced to what some critics call the ‘quasi
mystical realm’.”32
Margaroni brings up a narrative point in the Timaeus that addresses the notion of
chora as “space” in relation to Freud’s assertion that “the same space cannot have two
different contents,” a point representative of western thinking for both the Greeks and the
Hebrews, as well as in terms of Freud’s questionable notion of the “evolution” through
recapitulation from the Egyptians to the Greeks and Hebrews. Addressing a “narrative
that Critias shares . . . in the opening of the dialogue,” Margaroni writes: “Critias tells us
of how the archaic history of Athens came to the Greeks through Salon’s encounter with
an Egyptian priest. Critias recalls the priest’s reprimand to the Greeks for ‘remaining
children’ in their tendency to erase what has preceded them, the very scene of their
production. It is precisely this forgetting, it seems, that has allowed the Greeks to posit
themselves at the site of logos.”33
Margaroni likewise situates Kristeva’s reference to and use of the chora temporally,
as “the beginning before ‘the Beginning,’ the mobile origin ‘before the imposition of ‘the
Word’,” as it correlates also with Slavoj !i"ek reference to the “the beginning of
beginnings.” In my estimation, viewing the chora in temporal terms would not offer
anything beyond a continuance of a type of nostalgia for a utopian past in the spirit of
Freud’s fort/da game. Conceiving the lost feminine divine in such a manner does not, in
other words, help first to face the erasure in order to then mourn and find healing for the
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loss. Further, I suggest that this type of nostalgia encourages just the sort of “return to
the origins” that post-modern continental thought disparages.
To further elaborate upon chora in terms of an ontologically prior state, rather than
a chronologically prior state, stressing the significance of the chora as indicating a state
or space inherent in each and every moment of existence rather than in some lost utopian
“oneness” one may find the need to reclaim in the present, Plato attunes his description of
chora as receptacle and as space. The word space implies nothingness. Likewise,
Margaroni makes a similar point concerning the chora; this is a point that is reminiscent
of Rosenzweig’s reference to eastern religious and philosophical traditions. She asserts
the chora addresses “the means for what, in the context of the Western logocentric
tradition, has repeatedly been given the status of nothing.” She continues: “The task of
psychoanalysis, according to [Kristeva], is to return to this nothing, exposing it as the
‘underlying’ but forgotten ‘causality’ of language and the subject.”34
This nothing, or that which has been erased through being identified with nothing,
is in fact not nothing in any purely negative sense, but is, rather, filled with fecundity and
possibility, at least if it can be liberated from its abjection and erasure. Although some
may claim that the chora, even in Kristeva’s use of it, is always contained within
language, or the symbolic, clearly one must acknowledge that the subject was not created
ex nihilo, or rather, created “out of” (i.e., coming forth “from”), precisely, “nothing” –
only now understood as the plentitude of the chora, rather that the merely negative
absence. The subject was, in other words, formulated out of a womb, or that from which
the symbolic order arises. Although Kristeva utilized Plato’s Timaeus, in her attempt to
34
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go back “before” the beginning, to seek an origin, the task to pursue in relation to our
present concerns is to fully flesh out a feminine divine applicable and appropriate for
living fully and freely in the present.
Recognition of the Never Really Lost Mother
And why not interpret one face of the Other, the god face, as based on feminine
jouissance?
Jacques Lacan, Book XX
One thing that is certain within this process of articulating a feminine divine is
that the depth and profundity of these teachings not only need not, but by necessity
cannot, function as a prototype for seeking a feminine divinity by attempting to piece
together a feminine divine figure to fill in for the void left from her death. Such an
approach to feminine divine would function in a manner not dissimilar to that of second
wave feminists involved with the Goddess movement. The feminine divine would then
be envisioned and set forth, even given some quasi-historical utopian matriarchal past
that is created, idealized and romanticized, turning a Heavenly Mother into an object of
adoration.
For, it appears to be human nature, when given a particular explicit object to
venerate, to lean toward idolatry in mistaking the object for the real cause for veneration,
or to confuse a belief for an object.35 It may be, rather, in the very structure of the
traumatic experience – such as the loss (or what is perceived at the level of the
unconscious as the loss) of the mother/womb, that idolatry itself emerges, out of the
This process of reification functions as an example of Alfred North Whitehead’s fallacy
of misplaced concreteness, or as the Lankavatara Sutra of Mahayana Buddhism indicates,
as a tendency for those who are not able to go beyond words or theories to mistake their
fingertip for what they are pointing at. See Lankavatara Sutra, trans. by D. T. Suzuki
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1932), 196.
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avoidance of the need to face the loss. This point is not to denigrate the worship of a God
as Heavenly Father and Jesus Christ as his son as they are depicted in image and art, it is
only to note that given the historical circumstances concerning religion and gender
identity in the West, the feminine divine may indeed need to come forth in a different
manner. Not coming up with a new object to worship opens the way for women as well
as men of faith to fully contemplate the feminine divine’s nature, who she is, and how
one may come to know her,
I suggest that an approach to the female divine should follow the model of
becoming divine rather than that of a becoming divine; for, the latter involves using some
idea of who she is to fill in for actually embodying her. As men have had the more
outward role model of a male divinity to emulate, an exploration of the feminine divine in
Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s writings suggest women may find a place of power in
embodying the divine, in declaring that what seemed to be lost in our culture has in fact
always been completely present: the feminine divine.
These insights suggest a radical re-visioning of a feminine divine in Western
philosophy and theology, as well as a transvaluation of reality. Luce Irigaray develops
such a re-vision in utilizing imagery from Plato’s allegory of the cave. In a
transvaluation of this allegory Irigaray points out that the cave is the womb from which
all things are born and should not be left behind in the search for the real/ideal form. She
offers not just a reversal still stuck in dualisms such as nature/culture, matter/spirit,
feminine/masculine, Goddess/God, however, but instead a true transformative reversal.
Irigaray provides an account of life before the mighty reversal in the following passage:
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. . . the story goes, . . . men . . . are living in one, same, place. A place shaped like a
cave or a womb.
Turned Upside-down and Back-to-front. 36
Firmly established within the western philosophical trajectory, Irigaray utilizes imagery
related to pregnancy in her attempt to formulate an approach to a feminine divine. Hers
is a transvaluation of western metaphysics. Just as within the birthing process the infant
upon leaving the womb/cave need necessarily go through a “mighty reversal,” exiting the
womb/cave, “turned upside-down, back-to-front” as it enters into the world outside.
In acknowledging the cave as origin or home, Irigaray suggests birth not just as a
reversal, as in a dialectical antithesis of an earlier thesis in Nietzsche’s notion of
ressentiment, thus continuing to support the status quo of the “philosophy of the same.”
She instead provides a true break from the philosophy of the same and as with a camera
obscura in chiasmic reversal she fulfils Rosenzweig’s call to pass through the threshold
of love into life. Such a chiasmic reversal involves a reversal not as the flip side of what
is present, continuing a type of dualism that sustains the status quo; it is instead flipped
over, and turned around. As a child moving from the Real to the world outside, Irigaray
points toward a re-birth in acknowledging the cave as Real, and the world outside as the
false illusion, a world of truth Nietzsche would identify as “illusions about which one has
forgotten that this is what they are.”37 She is more akin to functioning as philosopher not
so much “as man,” in the manner Rosenzweig first praised Nietzsche, but as mother, or
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Luce Irigaray, The Speculum of the Other Woman (Ithaca, NY: Ithaca UP, 1974), 244.
Nietzsche, On Truth and Lies, 47.
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rather-- hearkening back to the “origin” of Western philosophy--to Socrates in his role of
philosopher as mid-wife.

In many respects emphasizing the notion of a feminist philosophy of religion as it
functions within the history of western philosophy indicates a type of “return of the
Mother.” The stylistic rendering of this particular historical and philosophical trajectory
includes insights from Rosenzweig concerning revelation and insights from Nietzsche
concerning overcoming; for, the returning to the origin or facing what qualifies as the
maternal realm as feminine divine may offer Western philosophical discourse a repetition
of the same, but now in a wholly different manner. It functions not through nostalgia for
a lost home. It rather involves recognition of what was always present, recognition of
fecund possibilities within the emptiness of space always accessible to everyone in any
given moment.
Accordingly, to paraphrase a line from T. S. Eliot, it represents the sort of
“returning home” after a long journey, only now to become cognizant of, or to know it,
for the first time. Where Rosenzweig calls for a transvaluation of Western metaphysics
in the emergence of the philosopher as man, it is not until Luce Irigaray that one may find
a philosopher as woman, flipping western metaphysics on its head, newly naming what
had become abject, dead, forgotten--the maternal womb as Plato’s allegorical cave--as, in
fact, the empty origin of being, filled with potentiality, power, creativity, and life. It is
the emptiness, then, not of death, but of life – as she extols it through her transvaluation.
In summary, perhaps the very potent, powerful, fecund, realization of the maternal
realm no longer as abject but as divine origin may provide an opening toward cultivating
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a contemplative awareness of a feminine principle never before developed in the West.
Again, the attempt to recover the lost feminine divine may find its way “home” not in
seeking Goddess imagery as a new role model to live by. For, this would provide another
model for a becoming divine. Instead, through having a face-to-face encounter with
emptiness as the ultimate truth, a sublime woman may become divine, “mourn” the loss
of the mother without continuing the compulsive search for some mother substitute, and
then speak from the very place of emptiness as it relates to the feminine principle. The
mourning of the loss of the (old) mother suddenly shows itself to be the very gate through
which one can at last move “into life,” as Rosenzweig writes. The loss of the “the
mother” at this point shows itself to be, in reality “the gateway” of the feminine divine.
For the divine woman to laugh, for a woman to adhere to her own sense of energy
without falling back into the masculinist zero-sum formulation of libidinal economy, and
without being excluded from academic discourse as a result, there must be a
transvaluation of Western metaphysics that goes beyond--or rather slides underneath-contemporary continental post-modern thought. One way to approach a revolutionary
transvaluation is to recognize the pre-Oedipal as more closely related to the origin of life,
that what appeared to be “nothing” is actually the origin of everything. Peter Davis
interprets Andreas-Salomé as suggesting just such an approach to a feminine divine:
“Andreas-Salomé’s view of the core of femininity [is] as stable, rooted, undifferentiated
and originary, or . . . essentially ungraspable, but which lies at the origins of all life.”38
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This recognition of emptiness as truth, although perhaps quite difficult for a
Western mind to contemplate, offers one avenue for approaching the great Mother, or the
vast womb out of which everything arises. A westerner may experience this emptiness,
not as a vast womb of potentiality, but as a wholly negative nothingness. Likewise the
“maternal realm,” or Freud’s reference to the Oceanic Feeling, both relating to the period
of time when a child is at one with the mother and has not yet developed a separate sense
of self, may also be experienced as negative nothingness, and as a corollary, abject, lost,
forgotten, or dead. However reflections on the feminine principle may lead to the insight
that what seems to be nothingness is in fact a potent and powerful primordial vast
fecundity of possibility. As everything exists in it, it is always present in all being.
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Chapter Five:
Unveiling the Feminine Divine:
Andreas-Salomé - Mother of Psychoanalysis
I repeat my argument that Nietzsche captures the notion of a transfiguration
through his philosophical narrative of one able to overcome: Zarathustra as Übermensch.
As I suggested, reading Rosenzweig against Nietzsche, and defending Nietzsche against
Rosenzweig’s critique, brings forth a type of feminine divine. This leads as well to a type
of philosophically historical “overcoming” of the past as it functions as a fundamental
aspect of Rosenzweig's and Nietzsche’s writings in general. There still may arise,
however, as I’ve previously noted, a more fully fleshed out notion of the feminine divine
that does not remain in the written page alone, but that can only be embodied. Just as I
suggest the “face behind the face” of Rosenzweig’s Star, the feminine divine, shines
behind the façade only in “facing” the loss of the Mother god, I also assert that the “face
behind the face” in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra is an actual, embodied woman: Lou AndreasSalomé. In this chapter I will offer some remarks on how Lou Andreas-Salomé’s
thinking relates to some of Rosenzweig’s veiled references to a feminine divine, as well
as to how her thinking relates to Nietzsche’s writings concern a feminine divine as well.
I then make clear the importance of acknowledging her in the eventual coming forth of
the sort of feminist philosophy of religion I am working toward.
There is a tantalizing mirroring relation between the texts I have been working
with in this dissertation and Nietzsche’s own personal interactions with Andreas-Salomé.
The confluence concerns the manner in which Andreas-Salomé in many respects was not
Nietzsche’s disciple, but was actually responsible for some of the key motivation for
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Nietzsche to accept the eternal recurrence of the same in terms that I identify with the
feminine divine.

Where French Feminist thought in many respects follows from Nietzsche, Freud
and Lacan, there is also, I suggest, a manner in which Andreas-Salomé views primary
narcissism that resonates with Kristeva’s reference to the Platoic chora. Both Irigaray
and Kristeva value the chora-like, maternal realm. They both also validate what Freud
treats as primary narcissism as a fundamental and essential stage in the growth in an
individual’s psyche from a sense of oneness toward a sense of self.1
Andreas-Salomé stands in contrast to Freud, however, concerning narcissism in
one striking manner. She was, after all, as Lisa Appignanesi and John Forrester describe,
“the great understander of Freud and of Freudian metapsychology.” Psychoanalysis
became, as Appignanesi and Forrester, state: “Lou’s baby.”2 Appignanesi and Forrester
further note that “it would be appropriate to see Lou as the mother of psychoanalysis.” A
need becomes clear, then, to place Andreas-Salomé squarely in the prominent yet
generally over-looked role as: “. . . the good mother whose life-loving optimism imbues
all her writings, which appropriately focus on female sexuality, on love and on questions

1

For perspectives on how Lou Andreas-Salomé functioned at the crux or confluence of
writers such as Nietzsche, Freud, and French Feminist Philosophers, see Julia Borossa
and Caroline Rooney, “Suffering Transience and Immortal Longings: Salome Between
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Caroline Rooney, “Reservations . . . Concerning Libido Theory and the Afterlife of
Psychoanalysis,” Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 9, no. 1 (April 2004); Lorraine
Markotic, “There Where Primary Narcissism Was, I Must Become: The Inception of the
Ego in Andreas-Salome, Lacan, and Kristeva,” American Imago 58, no. 4 (2001): 813-36.
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Lisa Appignanesi and John Forrester, Freud’s Women (New York, NY: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1992), p 257.
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of narcissism and sexual difference.” Appignanesi and Forrester situate her as the
“mother . . . whose roots . . . lie in turn-of-the-century romantic Lebensphilosophie, that
peculiarly German hankering after that oceanic spirituality, that sense of wholeness,
which Freud had rejected and which Lou never altogether leaves behind.”3
Furthermore, Andreas-Salomé wrote, in one of the few articles she composed on
psychoanalysis that has so far been translated into English, of the double/dual aspect of
narcissism. She stands face to face with Freud regarding the notion of narcissism. Art
critic and philosopher Victor Mazin notes, concerning Andreas-Salome’s position on
narcissism in relation to Freud:
If for Freud, narcissism, as a formation of one’s own self-image, created the
conditions for self-identification, for the birth of the subject, then for Salomé,
narcissism presupposed not collecting oneself but rather dissolving oneself into
the surroundings, self-dissemination close to de-personalization, denial of the
boundaries of one's image. 4
I suggest that Andreas-Salomé is able to explore in her notion of the “dual orientation of
narcissism” the notion of an overcoming of self as a transfiguration akin to the movement
Nietzsche and Rosenzweig, as well as perhaps Goethe before them, made. This is a
transfiguration based on acknowledging the dual energies of eros and thanatos, as it is
also like the “moment” marked at the crossing points in a transvaluation of the cognition
of the All that Rosenzweig attempts to depict in a passage from Part II of the Star: “That
which had struggled to the surface out of God’s ‘Nought’ as self-negation of this Nought
re-emerged from its immersion to God’s living ‘Aught,’ not any longer as self-negation,
but rather as world-affirmation.”
3

Ibid., 241-42.
Victor Mazin, “The Femme Fatale – Lou Andreas-Salomé,” Journal of European
Psychoanalysis 14 (Winter-Spring 2004): 1.
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Rosenzweig’s description of what appears to be “nothing” as the “Nought,” is, as
I’ve pointed out, an idea of “nothingness” that is actually filled with possibility. He
continues: “God’s vitality thus became to a certain extent again a Nought,” but this
Rosenzweig describes as “a Nought on a higher level, Nought only with reference to that
which emerged from it but in its own right a ought full of character, in short no Nought
but an Aught.” Rosenzweig continues with this discourse, seeming to recognize a certain
sense of dual tension within the realm of being and non-being, of unity and
disintegration, of going under to go over, of eros and thanatos, especially as he comes to
write of the notion of a conversion experience:
If one wanted to regard God’s vitality as such a background say, of the manifest
creative power it would justifiably have to be countered that this emergence could
not have taken place out of the mythical vitality of the concealed God, but only
out of its conversion into the revealed.5
Rosenzweig plays with a structure, setting up references to a revealed God, and a
concealed God that in some respects resemble my references to a recognition of the
womb-like “maternal realm” in a feminist metaphysics as the “flip side of life.” For, as
Rosenzweig indicates, it is only out of the Nought, that the Aught arises. Rosenzweig
describes such a structure as he depicts in his language/thought, in terms that fail to
provide a definitive meaning – it is, as the saying goes, a “problem that has no name.”
Rosenzweig writes as much: “This conversion, however lacks a name; it is no more than,
as it were, the geometric point out of which the emergence takes place.” This “lacking”
is actually no “lack” at all, but rather an inexhaustible fullness.

5
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This place is as the point--or moment, in temporal terms--of a crossing over, as
Nietzsche describes it in Part II of Zarathustra, just before his depiction of an
overcoming of human tendencies toward becoming superhuman, or the Ubermensch. For
Nietszche too describes this overcoming in terms of place, a crossing point, which
Nietzsche refers to as a gateway, one “that has two faces” where “two paths meet,” two
paths that “contradict each other . . . offend each other face to face.” It is, Zarathustra
says, “[h]ere at the gateway that they come together.”
Whatever transformative conversion experience Rosenzweig and Nietzsche
depict, Rosenzweig in theological discourse and Nietzsche in narration, seems dependent
on the meeting of a dual nature, whether that be referring to directions in time such as
forward/backward, embodied genders such as male/female, motivations toward life such
as eros or thanatos, or aspects of existence such as divine/human. I associate such a dual
aspect of existence with the need to recognize the reality of both light and dark. I
emphasize this as I associate it with Goethe’s culturally contextual (even if not
consciously direct) influence on Nietzsche, Rosenzweig, and Freud for that matter, in
acknowledging the importance of seeing/recognizing what Goethe referred to as the
“realm of the mothers,” what Nietzsche’s referred to as the Dionysian, what Freud
referred to as the oceanic feeling--or what he also, perhaps, in his final iteration of the
death drive in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, recognizes as a tendency toward not so
much annihilation as disintegration.6 The death drive as such involves not a violent

6

Andreas-Salomé also addresses the death drive as akin to the notion of disintegration in
her later work as a psychoanalyst. See Andreas-Salome, “Dual orientation of
Narcissism,” The Psychoanalytic Quarterly 31 (1962): 1-30. It may also be important to
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killing, but instead a quiet process of disintegration, as it manifests itself as a
breakthrough into an entirely new sort of “integration.”
Even as I attempted to bring out Kristeva’s emphasis on the maternal realm no
longer as abject, but as fundamental to human experience, and to be associated with the
maternal realm, I suggested that a recognition of this fact could play a role in addressing
not only an individual’s sense of lack or longing—the melancholy of a vague knowing
that something seems to be missing--but also, as a variation on a cultural recapitulation of
the Freudian theory of ontology recapitulating phylogeny, a collective experience of a
people/nation who may be experiencing a longing for mother, for “mother-land,” as a
“problem that has no name,” in Betty Friedan’s famous phrase.7
One thing is certain: Andreas-Salomé indicated in her essay “The Dual
Orientation of Narcissism” a recognition, in relation to narcissism, of the significance of
sitting with the tension, or, as another of Andreas-Salome’s protégées, Rilke, more
famously wrote, to “[l]ive the question now.” Such ambiguity assumes the ability to sit
with the tension between “desire for individuality and the contrary movement toward
conjugation and fusion.”8 Andreas-Salomé marks the movements as happening
concurrently; there is not a sense of either/or in her approach.
She describes the dualism in terms that hark back to a state of non-dualism. She
demonstrates a way that the oceanic feeling as chora remains, just as I assert through a
note that Freud was in close correspondence with Andreas-Salome while writing Beyond
the Pleasure Principle.
7
A recognition of a melancholy for a lost homeland resonates with land issues
throughout the world today, perhaps most especially in a location that seems to exhibit
implications that could lead to a most devastating conclusion, that is the conflict between
Israel and Palestine as each continues to fight for their own purported “homeland.”
8
Andreas-Salome, Dual Orientation, 4.
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form of recapitulation that the feminine divine remains in a collective society/culture,
even as the development of the ego as a separate sense of self appears to joust it from its
moorings as grounding of being. Andreas-Salomé writes of this tension/dualism in the
following manner:
In this dual orientation of narcissism the relations of the libido would be
expressed in our being rooted in our original state; we remain embedded in it, for
all our development as plants remain in the earth, despite their contrary growth
toward the light. Even the physical processes of sex and procreation are bound to
units which remain undifferentiated, and the erogenous zones are the residues of
an infantile state from which the bodily organs have long since been separated in
the service of self-preservation.9
Stating the “dual” nature of narcissism not only acknowledges narcissism in a revised,
more positive light than Freud had considered, but it also acknowledges a dual aspect of
life – one reflected, following Feuerbach, in the God/s that humans create. Such God/s
must then, necessarily include both the masculine and feminine, both a father and mother.
Perhaps another obscure, forgotten rhizome-like linkage of Andreas-Salomé, this
time through Rosenzweig, is with his close colleague Martin Buber, who had a strong
appreciation of Andreas-Salomé.10 At Buber’s request Andreas-Salomé wrote an essay
called “Eroticism,” where, as Bianca Theisen writes in her essay “Spacing the Feminine,”
Andreas-Salomé “argued . . . that the male and the female are opposed only on a surface
level, while at a deeper level these apparent oppositions in fact cross over into each other
and meet.”

9

Ibid.
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In the essay, Andreas-Salomé explores a certain structure in a type of move
toward a non-duality between male and female, or at least as a means to transcend gender
altogether through the “crossing over” she writes of as a literary structure in the phrase
“duality as unity and unity as duality.”11 Accordingly, coinciding with the theme of my
approach to the feminine divine in terms of choric space, and linking Andreas-Salomé
with Kristeva as well, Theisen quotes Kristeva in “suggest[ing] that feminist theory
depart from the ‘dichotomy man/woman as an opposition […] belonging to
metaphysics.” Furthermore, Theisen attempts to argue for a “space of the feminine [. . .]
delineated topologically as an empty space that can be occupied by either male or
female.”12
Andreas-Salomé is able, as it turns out, to conceive of the All of the philosophers
of German Idealism in terms that Nietzsche and Rosenzweig tried to articulate. She
writes as much in her essay “The Dual Orientation of Narcissism” in recounting a
feminist re-envisioning of the Narcissus myth. In this essay she addresses one important
aspect of the Narcissist myth that I propose my extrapolation of the feminine divine may
address as a more authentic approach to the All than the one Rosenzweig identified in
German Idealist philosophy. It works as an approach to the All that deconstructs the
“master narrative” in western approaches to nature. It can provide a re-visioning of the
western narrative “myth” on nature that, within the framework of a more fully developed
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feminist theology, may work in the service of a feminist approach to environmental
ethics.13
Andreas-Salome writes:
It is somewhat to the discredit of the godfather of our term, Narcissus, hero of the
mirror, if its use brings to the fore only the eroticism of self-enjoyment. Bear in
mind that the Narcissus of legend gazed, not at a manmade mirror, but at the
mirror of Nature. Perhaps it was not just himself that he beheld in the mirror, but
also himself as if he were still All: would he not otherwise have fled from the
image, instead of lingering before it? And does not melancholy dwell next to
enchantment upon his face? Only the poet can make a whole picture of this unity
of joy and sorrow, departure from self and absorption in self, devotion and selfassertion.14
Andreas-Salomé provides an appropriate approach to the All in terms that may make a
distinction between the All of philosophical pursuits, and the All of mystical oneness
with/as divine, through the poet as midwife in bringing a sense of new integration. This
All as Nature is the mirror that Narcissus sees face to face; a nature associated with an
originary oneness through the dual nature of “joy and sorrow, departure from self and
absorption in self, devotion and self-assertion.” One may utilize her view in an approach
to nature, that is not like the womb/maternal realm as abject, lifeless, “invisible,” etc., but
instead as the home we came from, and will return to. Perhaps Andreas-Salomé may be
the face behind the face; the mother figure who in a myriad of potential influences may
show her face in the history of western philosophy of religion, and as a fore-runner for a
final recognition of woman and man becoming divine.

13

Andreas-Salomé presents an alternative approach to nature that has some resonance
with the maternal realm or chora. In her attempts to redeem Narcissism from its abject
status, she names both nature and the maternal realm in renewed terms.
14
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
On The Feminine Divine: Longing for
Maternal Realm/Home as the Problem That Has No Name
In order to find some measure of closure in the form of concluding remarks
concerning my reading of Rosenzweig’s and Nietzsche’s texts, and the direction I take
them toward exploring a philosophy of religion that includes an authentic approach to a
feminine divine, I reiterate the importance of acknowledging Rosenzweig and Nietzsche
as they function as harbingers for a re-evaluation of the aim of philosophical discourse in
general. I have tried to show that both thinkers have altered the historical trajectory from
“Iona to Jena” in ways that question the “master narrative” in which western philosophy
has unfolded.
I presented the possibility of viewing their work as marking a shift in the history
of philosophy, not only as that shift is generally accepted, in the way of taking them
whereby they continue to influence postmodern thought, but also insofar as their writings
include many implicit as well as explicit references to a feminine divine. I have shown
how the impact of their work can lead to a reassessment of the role that philosophy plays
in academics, as well as, at least potentially, in society.
I formulated my argument by beginning with an evaluation of Rosenzweig’s
writings, as they appeared to dismiss Nietzsche for not fully “facing” the revelation of
love, and also for lacking a will to faith in a transcendent male monotheistic God.
Against such a dismissal, however, I have shown how Nietzsche can be read to open an
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approach to a type of divinity more to be associated with the feminine divine. I have
offered a reading of Zarathustra, especially, that depicts Nietzsche as elaborating a
Faustian-like need to “descend in order to ascend,” emblematic of the move towards a
transvaluation of masculinist values.
This reading suggests Nietzsche’s Zarathustra functions not as philosopher or
theologian, but as “mid-wife” for the “higher men” able to enact a type of transformation
through reading the text. Against Rosenzweig’s claim that Nietzsche falls short of being
able not just to write about such a transition, but also to embody it, I argued that
Nietzsche does in fact depict his creation Zarathustra, if not himself, as one able to cross
the threshold of love into life. I suggested that it was actually Rosenzweig who was not
able fully to grasp the aspects of what I refer to as a feminine divine because he
continued to hold to conventional notions of God in terms of revelation.
I explored the manner in which Lou Andreas-Salomé, in her interaction with
Nietzsche, and perhaps as she influenced his thinking and life, provided insights that not
only directly influenced Freud, but also, in perhaps a more indirect manner, influenced,
through Freud and Lacan, some French Feminist theorists. I referred to these theorists in
attempting to bring forth a feminist philosophy of religion that in a very fundamental way
suggests a radical transvaluation of contemporary Western philosophical discourse.
I identified the ways that Rosenzweig and Nietzsche may be used to make a
contribution, therefore, in the coming forth of a more fully defined feminist philosophy of
religion. As noted, such a philosophy of religion would have to be one that included and
emphasized not so much just a discourse on what impact the existence of a feminine
divine may have on philosophical as well as psychological, social, even political
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endeavors in contemporary Western thought and society, but also what the experience of
a feminine divine itself may entail. This I presented an acknowledgment of the “maternal
realm” as a fundamental “beginning” not only in our “historical lives,” but also of every
moment in human experience.
Furthermore, I have identified and highlighted a recognition of the maternal realm
in chronological, ontological, and in some respects (as I have indicated with Freud and
Nietzsche), even in geographical terms. I’ve shown how Freud and Nietzsche appeared
haunted by the significance of a pre-history in what I associate with the maternal realm,
and as a geographical location, specifically Egypt. The notion of focusing on such
originary “beginnings” may also be associated with the beginnings, not only of an
individual’s biological life, but also in terms of her ontological being, that is in how, in
each and every moment, thoughts, perceptions, and actions/behavior come forth.
This ontological beginning arises out of an “emptiness” that is not, as I’ve
explored, void of all life, but is instead inexhaustibly full with fecund potential. Such a
fecundity has become abject in western thought/life; it has become void. Societal,
cultural, theological, and religious “conditioning” seems to have functioned to conflate
being full with possibility with being empty of any quality at all. It, along with the whole
maternal realm associated with it, has become abject, invisible, not there. We have no
words in fact to describe it, as it has no “name” in conventional language. I can depict it
only as a longing, a longing that finally shows itself to be a longing for a home one never
really left in the first place – a womb which one gets back to at last, rather than, as had
only seemed to be the case all along, out of which one has long ago been cast. It
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resembles a “fall” as “becoming divine” from which arises the recognition that one never
fell in the first place.
In sum, through a feminist approach to Rosenzweig’s Star and Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra, I offer a foundation for a feminist philosophy of religion that includes the
feminine divine. I demonstrate the importance of my research in helping to develop and
utilize a type of feminist philosophy based on what Jantzen refers to as birth, procreation,
and life rather than on the necrophilia or love of death associated with the masculinist
philosophical tradition.1 Although I begin my analysis with Rosenzweig's and
Nietzsche’s work, through my particular methodological approach using the work of
French feminists and Lou Andreas-Salomé I provide a feminist voice or perspective that
is not a corollary to, an alternative reading of, nor any other form subject to being coopted by a “masculinist” approach. This work, therefore, has far reaching implications
for the broader study of western philosophy of religion, as well as of western thought in
general.
Embodying the Feminine Divine: Inter-Religious, Inter-Cultural, Inter-Political
Discourse
Just as I explore the feminine divine as necessarily not in terms of “God in a
skirt,” I likewise find that a feminist philosophy of religion based on my assumptions
concerning a feminine divine helps to provide a foundation for viewing difference in
inter-religious, inter-cultural, and inter-political dialog. This feminist philosophy of
religion based upon my approach to a feminine divine would not only tolerate difference,

1

See Grace Jantzen, Becoming Divine: Towards a Feminist Philosophy of Religion
(Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1999).
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but absolutely depend upon it. I argue for an awareness of a non-dual experience, that is,
an experience not referring to dualism or monism (nor pluralism for that matter) but
instead as I articulate it, as “not two.”
I refer to the concept of “non-duality” in terms of the feminine divine in order to
indicate a “trans-dualistic” solution that moves not only beyond dualism, but also beyond
monism and pluralism as well. This approach breaks from the circle of arguments
between these three purportedly basic positions that have proven themselves to be mostly
ineffective in inter-personal communication. To expand the notion of nondualism, I
provide a brief formula: to say that x and y (male and female, spirit and matter, good and
evil, etc.) are “not-two” is the not the same as saying either that they are “one and the
same thing” or that they are “many (‘more than two’) things”; rather, it is to remove the
relationship between x and y from the whole context of conceptualization in which such
quantitative qualities make sense, placing that relationship “beyond number.” Even as
they are beyond the conceptualization of number, at the same time, there is a recognition
as essential of the differentiation of x and y from one another that is captured already in
the denial of the “identity”—the being one-and-the-same—of x and y, when the language
of “not-two” is properly understood.
The term “non-dual” !as I identify it here, connects !w!i!t!h! !t!h!e! !n!e!e!d! Rosenzweig and
Nietzsche demonstrate of !b!r!e!a!k!i!n!g! !t!h!e! !o!l!d! “!i!d!o!l!s.!” It also provides the foundation for a
real feminine divine, in the sense of Lacan’s use of the term “real.” I argue that this
feminine divine contrasts with Jantzen’s reference to a feminine god in terms of “God in
a skirt”; again, it does not refer to some kind of ambiguously gendered or androgynous
“freak” as one split between two genders, or among many gendered alternatives, or
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finally, in trying to mix all genders into the one and the same. ! Concerning using this
paradigm in approaching difference, I emphasize the fact that there can be no awareness
of nondualism without difference; in fact the path to the feminine divine as non-dual
again, I reiterate, depends upon difference. The goal in this is not to erase difference, and
transgress/transcend conflict – instead, as Nietzsche so powerfully has shown us, it is to
face and sit with and work through agon/struggle.
I refer to a struggle in the process of recognizing the feminine divine, so as to
indicate that one may at first feel repelled by the viewing of the uncanny face of the
feminine divine. It is my goal to allow my reader to see that her face is not something to
fear, but actually one’s home. Her face, then, not only loses its power to repel, but it also
offers in its place insights into truly seeing that which has remained hidden for so long.
As I present this is the case, I also make the association between it and viewing the other
in terms that allow for an actual seeing them, not as other, or the same, but face to face.
Even as I explore some implications of how the concept of nonduality in/as the
feminine divine provides new insight into identity and difference, helping to provide a
way in which to view communications between peoples, if these ideas are to function
within the context of real personal, social, cultural and political situations, the
participants in dialog need necessarily to open to the insights I’ve explored in my
dissertation. As there is great promise in this, it also would take serious considerations
concerning the insights I aim to help my readers obtain.
I present here not a fully defined model for communications, therefore, but
instead some theoretical understandings concerning a feminist philosophy of religion or
theology arising from the western philosophical tradition that bring to the fore a feminine
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face of the divine as it has become abject in western thought and life. I reassert that it is a
bringing forth, however, that due to the very nature of it being abject is not necessarily a
natural or appealing rendition of a becoming divine.
As the face of the feminine divine may for most part be quite unbearable to look
at, I approach her through an indirect manner. I promote an awareness that what should
strike fear in her subjects is a model for a feminine divine that merely substitutes for the
real, not because she is truly “other,” as in wholly other, but instead because she has
become nothing more than a façade, a shallow replication of a mother substitute of the
missing/lost real mother. I seek to show that a becoming feminine divine is a demonic
parody of the real feminine divine I try to help my readers to face.
The feminine divine I present does not move directly, then, but again, only
indirectly, through a journey reaching back to a Rosenzweigian reading of Nietzsche’s
Zarathustra, as they both arose within the context of German culture entrenched with
images/references to the eternal feminine in Goethe’s Faust. In the real mother as
nondual “emptiness” we find at the end of this journey, a recognition of her as the ground
of all being, as the womb out of which the world arises. This feminine divine serves,
therefore, as an approach to theology and the philosophy of religion that, for the first time
I argue, is actually in the service of life. In this way my approach to the feminine divine
as I have laid out here in my dissertation in many ways ends up fulfilling Nietzsche’s and
Rosenzweig’s call for transformation.
I refer to my move in looping back to Rosenzweig and Nietzsche as following
Nietzsche in Heidegger’s assertion of need for simultaneity of all three of Nietzsche’s
historical models. In order to be truly “critical” of the present – that is to focus on the
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flame of truth as Arendt refers to in Benjamin’s text -- we must not continue on in the
same pattern of compulsive repetition, always seeking, but never really finding, our lost
mother/home. I emphasize the need for a feminist discourse that does not “transcend”
gender, dualism, or difference altogether, asking for some odd, impractical overly
idealistic utopian vision of universal harmony according to a certain human essence of
being (something Rosenzweig so vehemently argued against), but again, only within
individuality/difference.
The feminine divine as a non-dual experience shows itself as the divine face that
truly cannot be faced and survive, at least not in the sense of maintaining the same
approach to the divine, gender, or in fact to all of reality. This face is not so much
beautiful, as in a becoming Goddess, all benevolent, all good, but instead the sublime,
“shatteringly beautiful” face of the real mother; it is that face behind the face of
Rosenzweig’s divine, that peaks out through the façade/face of the masculinist God. It is
also the face that offers a means of transvaluation of traditional metaphysics, as well as
masculinist approaches to philosophy and theology.
The Face Behind the Face: The Kiss of Medusa
One of the central presumptions that both Nietzsche and Rosenzweig make upon
their readers, is that they need to think concretely in terms of the body and embodiment
when attempting to "philosophize with a hammer," as Nietzsche recommends, or engage
in the "New Thinking" with Rosenzweig. It is therefore the case that "the feminine
divine" is no mere "abstraction," but, rather, always incarnates herself in one form/figure
or another. I make the suggestion, therefore, that Rosenzweig's Star is itself (including
especially as Rosenzweig himself conceived and wrote it) the face in which God
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incarnates Himself. In a similar fashion to Nietzsche's "Zarathustra" as the form/figure
through which Dionysus announces his own coming as incarnated in Nietzsche's actual
works (and in/as Nietzsche himself, if one discerns the sense shining through the nonsense of Nietzsche’s "insane" ravings in the letters and cards he sent from Turin after his
breakdown in Jan. 1889), just so must and does the feminine divine incarnate herself in/as
Andreas-Salomé. It is Andreas-Salomé who "mothers" and gives motherly birth and
nurturance to Nietzsche. Furthermore, it is Andreas-Salomé, at least and especially
through Nietzsche, who is then able to “redeem” Rosenzweig, who may never have been
able, otherwise, to see the very face of the mother who mothered him through Nietzsche.
In relaying this trajectory, of a circling back to Nietzsche, we see the cyclic nature
of return, that is in terms of seeking the face behind the face, and after having
experienced her, then attempting to depict her not so much as the Medusa’s Head, or
even in the laugh of the Medusa. I depict her instead, first of all, in acknowledging the
mother embodied in human form as Andreas-Salome, but also as the feminine divine,
who, although having seemed to have disappeared within the psychological, sociological,
and historical West, presents herself in the nondual awareness that has always been
present. One may then face the shatteringly beautiful look of Medusa as she turns to us
with her motherly and nurturing kiss. This is the kiss/embrace the western psyche longs
for, that problem that has no name, it is also the face of one who has always been present,
waiting, for her children to return home.
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